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Using a unique household panel data set for rural India covering the years 1993/1994 and 
2004/2005 we test a key theoretical assertion of caste and its effects, namely that marginalised 
social groups fare worse in terms of income levels when resident in villages dominated by 
upper castes. We also test whether marginalised groups perform better or worse in villages 
where their own group is dominant. We proceed to explore the implications for income 
growth and for poverty incidence and persistence. After controlling for potential locational 
confounds, upper caste dominance confers a positive externality on other social groups. This 
externality is discounted by group specific ‘oppression’ effects which range in size from zero 
to 16 percent of mean income and peak for Scheduled Caste (SC) and Other Backward 
Classes (OBC) households. Further, we identify positive and large own dominance (village 
‘enclave’) effects that account for as much as a quarter of mean income for SC households in 
the post reform years. These results are robust to how dominance is measured. We also 
identify pathways through which identity-based welfare disparities may be reduced; while 
such disparities are widening, their causes show signs of both persistence and change. 
Whereas education matters, land redistribution provides the key to eliminating the adverse 
effects of upper caste dominance. Even after factor endowment and other controls have been 
added, and with the notable exception of those in SC dominated villages, SCs not only 
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‘March 1949: A group of Scheduled Caste members from villages around Delhi had 
been thrown out of their homes by Jat landowners angered that these previously 
bonded servants had the cheek to take part in local elections and graze their cattle on 
the village commons.   
June 1951: A village in Himachal Pradesh. A conference of Scheduled Castes is 
attacked by Rajput landlords. The SCs are beaten up with sticks, their leaders tied up 
with ropes and confined to a cattle pound.  
June 1952: A village in the Madurai district of Madras State. A SC youth asks for tea 
in a glass at a local shop. Tradition entitles him only to a disposable coconut shell. 
When he persists, he is kicked and hit on the head by caste Hindus.   
June 1957: A village in the Parbani district of Madhya Bharat. Newly converted 
Buddhists [previously “untouchable” Hindus] refuse to flay carcasses of dead cattle. 
They are boycotted by the Hindu landlords, denied other work and threatened with 
physical reprisals.’   (Guha 2007; 380-81)  
 
INTRODUCTION  
More than 50 years on and in spite of such early resistance, the aggressive use of 
affirmative action and radical legislative interventions, identity-based inequality and 
poverty have remained stark features of post-independence India (Deshpande 2001; 
Kijima 2006; Gang et al 2008a). Notwithstanding that the intensity of caste
1 barriers 
may have softened with the passage of time,
2 extensive reservations in public sector 
jobs, higher education institutions and political assemblies have not sufficed to 
prevent Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe households from being overrepresented 
among the country’s poor, illiterate and in the former case, also the landless.
3 
  
                                                 
1 Caste may refer to jati (sub-caste) or the more general varna, the latter comprising four broad occupational 
groups with Brahmins at the top and untouchables as a separate category. Each varna contains innumerable jatis 
who with few exceptions practice intra-marriage (endogamy).          
2 Examples from the recent past include caste demarcators in how people dressed and spoke and what they were 
allowed to do. In 19
th Century Kerala, “when a Namboodiri Brahmin approached, a Paraiya labourer had to cry 
out in advance, lest the sight of him pollute his superior” (Guha 2007; 287). Also in Kerala and when talking to a 
person of higher caste, members of lowly ranked castes were expected to use debasing words to describe 
themselves (Menon 1994;19). Nambissan (1996) presents historical illustrations of how Scheduled Caste children, 
while permitted to attend school, could be denied entry to the classroom. 
3 Scheduled Castes, comprising 16.2 % of the country’s population in 2001, are former ‘untouchables’, while 
Scheduled Tribes, accounting for 8.2 % of the population in the same year, are tribes perceived as historically 
disadvantaged.  Article 15 of India’s Constitution emphasises the ‘disabling’ effect of low social status and article 
46 underscores the collective responsibility for promoting the educational and economic interests of individuals of 
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe backgrounds (Bayly 1999; 68-69). The Constitution also refers to an 
additional category of disadvantaged citizens, an issue addressed firstly by the Other Backward Class Commission 
appointed by Prime Minister Nehru, and later and more decisively by the Mandal Commission (1978-80). The   3
While the endurance of practices expressive of a strict social hierarchy
4 might be 
expected to cement disparities and accentuate ill-being, key questions about the 
mechanisms and pathways through which caste, tribe and religious
5 identities 
translate into present day disadvantage have yet to be satisfactorily answered. In 
addition, little remains known about whether, and if so precisely in what directions, 
patterns, magnitudes and causes of identity-based disadvantage may be transmuting in 
the post reform era.
6  
In this paper we use a household panel covering the years 1993/1994 and 
2004/2005 to examine two possible explanations for identity-based disadvantage in 
rural India. The first, the oppression hypothesis, originates in M. N. Srinivas’s theory 
of caste dominance which portrays a caste that in addition to strong numerical 
presence is also economically powerful (Srinivas 1955). This oppression hypothesis is 
discrimination oriented, epitomises the introductory quotes and advances the view 
that historically marginalised groups fare worse when resident in villages dominated 
by upper castes. We test this hypothesis for income levels, and explore the 
implications for income growth and for poverty incidence and persistence.            
The second, the village enclave explanation, is theoretically ambiguous and 
captures a situation where a historically marginalised group is dominant at the village 
level. Upwards mobility may then be inhibited by factors that either wholly or in part 
are internal to the group in question. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) illustrate one 
such mechanism albeit in the urban context of Dadar, Mumbai, where the density of 
jati based labour market networks, via their effects on educational choice, is held 
responsible for slow upwards mobility across generations of low caste, young men.
 7 
In a rural setting, a strong preference for traditional occupations or the onset of social 
inertia (e.g. Peyton Young 2001) could give rise to similar, ‘interlocking’ effects.  
Empirical studies of education and labour market outcomes in (mainly immigrant) 
enclaves infuse more optimism about enclave potential (e.g. Edin et al 2003; Cortes 
                                                                                                                                            
Mandal Commission’s recommendations, which extended reservation benefits to OBCs, were declared 
constitutionally legitimate by the Supreme Court in 1992 after agitations and intense controversy (Parikh 1998).    
4 Such strictness resonates with Louis Dumont’s (1970) portrayal of purity and pollution as immutable principles 
of Hindu society (Bayly 1999; 15). M. N. Srinivas (1966) gives numerous examples of more fluid inter-caste 
relations, arguing that analysis of social relations through the lens of varna ‘successfully obscured the dynamic 
features of caste during the traditional or pre-British period (ibid. 1966;2).’  
5 Muslims, the largest religious minority, accounted for 13.4 % of India’s population in 2001.  
6 Our reference here is to India’s landmark economic liberalisation programme, initiated in 1991, but with its main 
effects kicking in only after the first panel round (See footnote 14). 
7 In contrast and using NSS data, Das (2007) finds evidence of successful self-employment enclaves among 
educated Muslim men in India.     4
2006). A less hostile village environment could prevent the psychological 
internalisation of self-fulfilling and negative self beliefs that might otherwise lock 
individuals of marginalised backgrounds into low level equilibrium traps (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000; Hoff and Pandey 2006). By reducing the social distance between 
parties to rural transactions, own enclaves could also, as Anderson’s (2005) evidence 
demonstrates, improve the operation of vital rural markets.  
While the oppression and the negative enclave explanation may inhibit income 
growth and contribute to poverty persistence, there is a marked contrast in how 
policies could address and alleviate identity-based disparities. While oppression 
would require society-wide attitudinal transformations, the negative enclave 
explanation would call for reforms targeting the marginalised community itself. The 
positive enclave explanation adds an intriguing policy dilemma: marginalised groups 
performing better in their own village enclaves could weaken the case for social 
integration.       
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
In India, empirical research on caste has focused on discrimination, mainly within 
the labour market (e.g. Banerjee and Knight 1985; Kingdon 1998 and 2002; Dutta 
2006; Iversen and Raghavendra 2006; Thorat and Attewell 2007). The evidence 
shows that individuals of SC and ST background are indeed at a disadvantage
8  – 
through lower wages, a higher propensity of being stuck in dead end jobs (e.g. 
Banerjee and Knight 1985) or inferior employment terms, such as casual employment 
(Dutta 2006; Das and Dutta 2007). Recent research has also documented how 
discrimination extends to upper end urban occupations and jobs (Madeshwaran and 
Attewell 2007; Newman and Deshpande 2007).    
While important, the labour market is only one market where individuals from 
marginalised social groups may experience differential treatment. To date, however, 
little systematic knowledge exists about discrimination in credit, insurance or other 
key markets or particular to rural areas, markets for agricultural inputs and outputs.
9 
There is also limited evidence on whether a person’s caste, religious or tribal identity 
                                                 
8 Gang et al (2008b) confirm that OBCs also have lower living standards relative to the mainstream population.  
9 Hatlebakk (2009) presents evidence on the relationship between caste and credit transaction terms in rural Nepal.    5
circumscribes the access to poverty-oriented public policy programmes or public 
services in general.
10  
       Even so, Shah et al’s (2006) recent study of untouchability in rural India found 
that in 45-50 percent of the villages surveyed, Dalits were prevented from selling milk 
to village dairy cooperatives.
11 Such ‘bans’ could be rooted in purity and pollution 
ideals and the intimate links between a person’s identity and the preparation and 
handling of food and water; the same study found that in 30-40 percent of the same 
villages, Dalits were prevented from full participation in local markets and often from 
entering village shops.
12 Further and wellknown, SC hamlets tend to be separate from 
the main village and often have their own drinking water source.  
In rural Karnataka, children from orthodox Brahmin households may be forced to 
take a bath before entering their house after interacting with peers from ‘inferior’ 
castes while in school. A rich gamut of mechanisms for differential treatment thus 
persists and may affect everyday social interactions, limit the willingness to transact, 
the terms of such transactions as well as the access to productive resources, public 
policy programmes and services. Put differently, oppression could, in principle, 
circumscribe the access to all markets (land, labour, credit, insurance, output, and 
input markets), affect production costs and limit investment opportunities and returns.  
Our data do not permit a precise identification of discrimination within a 
particular market or in the access to a specific public service, but facilitate instead 
identification of upper caste oppression and of negative or positive village enclave 
effects on household economic welfare, measured by income. Further, by introducing 
control variables gradually in our econometric analysis, we are able to explore the 
pathways through which such oppression and enclave effects operate and whether the 
latter are transmuting in the post reform era. 
 Our study advances the literature as follows. Aggregating across markets, as we 
do, a small number of studies test for identity-based disadvantage, but do not test the 
effects of village level upper caste or own group dominance on the economic 
                                                 
10 Exceptions include Dreze and Kingdon’s (2001) study of school participation in rural India, suggesting that 
Scheduled Caste children have an ‘intrinsic disadvantage’ and a lower chance of attending school even after 
household wealth, parental education and motivation and school quality are controlled for. See also Thorat and 
Lee’s (2006) study of discrimination in food related government programmes. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) 
explore, among other issues, the effects of community heterogeneity on public services (goods) availability in 
India.   
11 The study covered 550 villages in 11 main states.  
12 As noted by Madsen (1991), Parry (1999), Iversen and Raghavendra (2006) among others, purity and pollution 
ideals make the connection between caste identity and the handling, preparation and serving of food acutely 
sensitive.    6
performance of different social groups.  Typically, existing studies use regression 
analysis of nationally representative cross-sectional data and Blinder Oaxaca or 
alternative decomposition techniques to quantify the disadvantage associated with 
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or religious identity (e.g. Kijima 2006; Gang et al 
2008a). Using All-India data, Kijima’s (2006) results suggest that such contrasting 
returns may account for up to 50 percent of the difference in mean consumption 
expenditure between SC/ST households and others. While Dercon and Krishnan 
(2007) use the ICRISAT household panel to evaluate the relative economic 
performance of SC/STs, their panel is limited to 204 households from six villages and 
two states. The lower educational attainment of SC/STs is found to fully account for 
their slower standard of living improvements. Dercon and Krishnan are unable to 
extensively test for the impact of village social structure and land ownership patterns 
on the relative welfare of marginalised social groups. 
In an innovative study particularly close to ours, Anderson (2005) presents the 
first attempt to make use of sociological and anthropological notions of caste 
dominance in an econometric analysis. For a data-set covering 120 villages in Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar, she is able to shed light on the mechanisms through which caste 
based disparities emerge and may be sustained. Specifically, she finds that Yadav 
households in villages where Yadavs are the dominant land owners have higher 
incomes than Yadav households in villages where the dominant land owners belong to 
a local upper caste. She attributes this result to the market for irrigation water’s failure 
to operate in villages with upper caste land dominance and concludes that social 
distance may prevent the efficient operation of crucial rural markets. 
Anderson’s study uses cross-sectional data for north and central Bihar and south 
and south-eastern Uttar Pradesh, which are part of India’s “poverty belt” and more 
than elsewhere in the country riddled by inter-caste tensions and conflict (Bayly 
1999;345). We use a panel data set that in its base year 1993/1994 is representative 
for rural areas of most of India’s major states (see section II). In contrast to Anderson, 
we estimate the impacts of upper caste and own group dominance on household 
income and explore the implications for growth and poverty for social groups where 
such effects may be expected to be most pronounced.
13 We also distinguish 
                                                 
13 The Yadavs in Anderson’s study are OBCs (Other Backward Classes) while the Scheduled Castes in our panel 
data set include numerous former untouchable, low status jatis such as Chamars or Satnamis (leatherworkers), 
Balmikis (sweepers) and Pasis in the North and Pallars and Paraiyars in the South.    7
externalities associated with residence in upper caste dominated villages from social 
group specific oppression effects within the same village regimes. Finally, our panel 
households are followed from 1993/1994 up to 2004/2005 which enables us to 
investigate whether India’s economic liberalisation programme, initiated in 1991 but 
with its main effects being felt only after the first panel round,
14 has mitigated, 
augmented or otherwise changed the effects of social distance, mediated through a 
traditional social hierarchy, on the functioning of markets and in turn household 
incomes.  
The paper is laid out as follows. Section II describes the data set, elaborates on the 
theoretical background and presents the empirical model for testing our hypotheses. 
Section III presents descriptive statistics on income and poverty levels and change and 
on education and land endowments by social group and village regime. Section IV 
presents the main empirical results, followed by robustness tests, and a computation 
of counterfactual income, growth and poverty to illustrate the order of magnitude of 
the oppression and enclave effects we are able to identify. Section V concludes.    
 
II.         DATA, THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRCAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
A.  The data set 
 
       The data reported on here are derived from two large-scale household surveys 
that cover most of the territory of India, known as the Human Development Profile of 
India (HDPI) surveys. The first round, HDPI-I, took place in 1993/94 and was carried 
out by India’s National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) on behalf 
of UNDP. The second round, HDPI-II, took place in 2004/05 and was carried out by 
NCAER on behalf of the University of Maryland. The primary purpose of the surveys 
was to collect detailed information on a large range of human development indicators, 
including income, which is the variable reported on here. These surveys are the first 
major ones for India to measure household income in a comprehensive and refined 
way, using more than fifty separate components. A full description of the variables, 
                                                 
14 Neither GDP growth, growth in the services sector nor private sector investment had picked up by the time the 
first panel round (1993/94) had been completed. For supportive evidence as well as fuller and more complex 
accounts of India’s growth turnaround, see Sen (2007) and Panagariya (2008).        8
summary statistics including comparison with other major India surveys
15, and an 
exposition of the sampling methodology can be found in Desai et al. (2009).  
A unique feature of this data is that a village questionnaire was administered in the 
second round in 2004/2005 and enables the construction of village social composition 
and land ownership distribution by jati (sub-caste). Further and similarly, the sub-
division of social groups in the household questionnaires allows us, in addition to the 
official categories of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Muslims, OBCs,
 16 other 
Hindus, and Others, to precisely identify the jati of individual households and thus to 
make comparisons of the economic performance of other social groups with that of 
upper-caste households, who mostly are Hindus.
17 These features depart notably from 
official data sets with collection of information on jati terminated after the 1931 
Census. 
     The first round of the survey uses a random sample of 33,230 households located 
in and representative of each of the rural areas in all (then sixteen) India’s major 
states. Initially, the aim was to re-interview 13,593 randomly selected rural 
households in the second round. Recontact details were, for various reasons, not 
always available and in the end 10,451 households in fourteen (plus three new) states 
participated in both rounds.
18 A residence-based sampling rule was adopted involving 
only households who had stayed in the village; migration and natural demise are 
reasons for attrition. After removing about 20 villages with missing social 
composition and land ownership information, we are left with a panel comprising 
9,111 households spread over 679 villages.   
 The findings reported here are strictly speaking valid only for households who 
choose not to migrate (cf. Rosenzweig 2003, Baulch and Hoddinott 2000, Dercon and 
Krishnan 2007). However, the comparison of living standards and changes therein 
                                                 
15 There is a close correspondence between the HDPI and other major surveys on mean values of all key variables; 
see Desai et al. (2009), Table 2. 
16 OBC lists, which include Muslims, are state-specific, regularly updated and rapidly expanding; entries often 
reflect political muscle rather than past discrimination. As Appendix 1 explains, manifestly political inclusions on 
the official list are reclassified and omitted from the OBC category used in our analysis.  
17 See Singh’s (1984) account of caste among non-Hindus and Jodhka’s (2004) in-depth discussion of Sikhism and 
caste. Punjab and to a lesser extent Haryana have many Hindu and Sikh households who all belong to the Jat 
community as well as Sikh SC households. Among Muslims, Fuller (1996) and other contributors to the same 
volume contend that while caste-like arrangements are common, few willingly admit to their existence. Jeffrey et 
al (2007; 43) note how ‘during the pre-colonial era there were marked divisions between a very small, upper caste 
Muslim elite and other Muslims castes, such as weavers, carpenters and barbers’. 
18 They are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar (+ Jharkand in round 2), Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh (+ Chhattisgarh in round 2), Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh (+ 
Uttaranchal in round 2) and West Bengal. Recontact details were largely lost in Assam due to a flood and in 
Karnataka because of human error.   9
across social groups – the focus of this paper – should not be much affected by this 
limitation: the variables caste, religion, education and income are not substantially 
different in the panel from those in a randomly selected rural refresher sample drawn 
to check the round 2 representativeness of the panel household sample (see Table 1 in 
the Appendix in Desai et al. 2009).
19  Furthermore, we performed a statistical test on 
whether or not inclusion in the panel of all households who participated in the first 
round is associated with our independent variable in the analysis, namely household 
income. Such a test provides evidence on whether or not the panel households are a 
selective group of households with respect to income. The test result reveals that after 
controlling for households’ demographic composition and educational attainment, 
household income is not associated with selection into the panel,
20 suggesting that the 
panel households in our analysis, with respect to income, are a randomly selected 
subsample of all rural households that participated in the first round. 
 
B.  Upper caste and own dominance – theory and definitions 
 
The caste dominance concept originates in the sociological and anthropological 
literature.  In Srinivas’s (1955; 18) own words:  
 
‘A caste may be said to be ‘dominant’ when it preponderates numerically over the 
other castes and when it wields preponderant economic and political power. A large 
and powerful caste group can more easily be dominant if its position in the local 
hierarchy is not too low.’
21  
 
The distinguishing characteristic of upper caste dominance may perhaps best be 
expressed as a combination of secular power and ritual status where the latter reflects 
the Varna hierarchical order with Brahmins topmost among four broad occupational 
ranks and with former untouchables (SCs) making up a separate category. The 
dominant social group could now be defined as the group (i) which represents a larger 
share of the village population than any other social group (nd); (ii) owning more 
                                                 
19 The table referred to reports the proportions of the panel household sample in round 2 and those of the refresher 
sample in categories of age (8 categories), gender (2), individual education (6), social group (6), place of residence 
(4), maximum adult education (6), and income (6). The absolute differences between the proportions of the two 
samples (38 comparisons in total) range from 0.04 to 5.28 percentage points, with a mean value of 1.20 and a 
median of 0.56 percentage points. 
20 The p-value corresponding to the null hypothesis that income is not associated with panel inclusion is equal to 
0.937. 
21 Srinivas (1959) subsequently added Western education and occupations to his list of determinants of dominance.      10
village land than any other social group (ld) (e.g. Dumont 1970); or (iii) both nd and ld 
(e.g. Srinivas 1955). While not exhaustive, (i)-(iii) clearly represent alternative 
measures of secular power.  
Numerical strength could translate into village level political muscle especially 
after the 73
rd Constitutional Amendment’s elevation of the status and significance of 
village Panchayats.
22 However, Anderson (2005) finds no effects of population 
dominance on economic outcomes. As we explain below, our adopted empirical focus 
on land dominance partly reflects a constraint imposed by de facto village structures 
in rural India but also exploratory regressions supportive of Anderson’s (2005) 
approach and Dumont’s (1970) assertion that dominance is rooted in economic power 
captured by landownership alone.
23      
Conceptually, let the land of village j, Lj, be distributed over m groups where ni 







i j n L                    ( 1 )  
 
Definitions: A dominant social group has the largest share of the village land of any 
social group. For members of the dominant social group in village j, village j is 
described as own group dominated or an own enclave. If the dominant social group in 
village j is upper caste, village j is upper caste dominated. Upper caste dominance is 
an example of what we call a village regime.         
 
This forms the conceptual backbone for our main analysis. Two types of 
criticisms may be levelled against this sociologically anchored dominance measure. 
Firstly, it neglects fragmentation or concentration among other social groups within a 
village; the more diverse and fragmented the remaining social groups, the more 
powerful the dominant group is expected to be. In addition, our dominance measure 
neglects the intensity of the power the dominant group is in a position to wield over 
other social groups. To neutralise such reservations, we use two alternative 
dominance measures as robustness checks. The first is the share of village land owned 
by the dominant group, the second a modified Herfindahl index. 
                                                 
22 Panchayats are village councils. The 73
rd Amendment came into force in April 1993.  
23 These results are not presented or further discussed here, but will be made available from an author website for 
interested readers.      
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The normalised Herfindahl (H) index is a popular measure of concentration or 
market power within economics. Its mirror image, the fractionalization index, has 
been widely used in empirical studies linking community heterogeneity to conflict, 
collective action and the access to public goods (e.g. Olson 1971; Banerjee and 
Somanathan 2007; Esteban and Ray 2009). However, neither is well equipped for 
capturing dominance. 
To see why, consider the Herfindahl index of concentration for village j which can 






i j n H
1
2  where    ] 1 , 0 ε j H        ( 2 )  
To gauge why Hj fails, let m=2 and n1=n2=0.5. While the market equivalent would be 
a situation of considerable concentration (limited fragmentation or fractionalization), 
the scope for group 1 to dominate group 2 should be exactly zero. To adjust for this 






=− ∑          (3) 
         
where the subscript d refers to the land share owned by the dominant group. For a 
given share of the village land owned by the dominant group, the more fragmented is 
the land ownership of other groups, the higher is Dj. In the example above, its value 
will be exactly zero, as it should be. 
To construct our village level dominance measures we combine village level 
information on social structure and land ownership with evidence of the locale-
specific hierarchical status of precisely identified jatis. The village questionnaire 
administered in round 2 identifies the jati of the numerically dominant social group in 
each village, the percentage of village land this social group owns along with similar 
information for the next 4-8 most numerous social groups. Anthropological and other 
evidence on the status of different jatis is then used to develop a more refined upper 
caste definition as explained in Appendix 1. Given generally inactive rural land 
markets (Anderson 2005), and that land-dominant groups tend to hold a much larger 
share of village land than any other group,
24 we assume that the village regime is 
identical in rounds 1 and 2.  
                                                 
24 Details are available from the authors.    12
C. Empirical model 
 
Both the oppression and the enclave hypothesis refer to the extent to which the 
income level of households from different social groups is affected by the social 
identity of the dominant land owners of the village in which they reside. To 
statistically test these hypotheses, we model the relative differences in income by 
social group and village regime, controlling for location and household 
characteristics, as follows: 
 
  01 2 3 4 ln( ) ht t t h t h t h t h YS C S T M U S O B C α ααα α =+ + + +    
    12 th h t h h SC DSC ST DST β β +×+×  
    34 th h t h h MUS DMUS OBC DOBC β β +× +×  
    01 2 th t h h t h h DUC SC DUC ST DUC γ γγ ++ × + ×   
    34 th h t h h MUS DUC OBC DUC γ γ +× +×  
    () th t h v h h t X π θη ε ++ + + ,     
 t={1993/1994,2004/2005}.        (4) 
 
Subscript  h denotes households, and t time. The real per capita income of a 
household
25 is denoted by Y and the five social groups a household can belong to are 
denoted by SC (Scheduled Castes), ST (Scheduled Tribes), MUS (Muslims), OBC 
(Other Backward Classes) and UC (Upper Caste). These are all dummy variables and 
take the value one if a household belongs to this group and zero otherwise. The 
village regime is modeled using the dummy variables DSC, DST, DMUS, DOBC and 
DUC, which take the value one if this particular social group is land dominant in the 
village in which the household lives, and zero otherwise.  
         The  last  three  terms  in  the  right hand side of equation (4) form the error 
structure of the model. The first two error terms are, respectively, a random household 
specific effect, θh, that is assumed to be independently distributed across households, 
and a random village specific effect, ηv(h)t, which is assumed to be independently 
distributed across villages. The third error term, εht, is an idiosyncratic error term and 
                                                 
25 Throughout income is per capita per annum and in constant 1993/94 prices, converted using NSSO state-specific 
rural CPIs. 
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is assumed to be independently distributed across households, villages and time. The 
assumption of a random household specific effect, as opposed to a fixed effect, is 
required since incorporating a household specific fixed effect would make it 
impossible to identify oppression and enclave effects since, as noted, the village 
regime is constant over time and a panel household lives in the same village in both 
rounds.  
        We estimate equation (4) by Least Squares for each of the two periods separately 
as all parameters are allowed to vary over time. Arbitrary correlation between 
households within a village is accounted for when calculating the standard errors ( 
e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
The α-parameters refer to the relative income differences between households of 
different social groups with UC as reference group. For instance, the parameter α1t 
(x100) corresponding to the variable SCh, is interpreted as the percentage difference in 
income, on average, between SC and UC households. Similarly, the enclave 
hypothesis refers to the β-parameters and the parameter β1t (x100) corresponding to 
the variable SChxDSCh, is interpreted as the percentage difference in income, on 
average, for SC households living in a village dominated by their own social group. 
The oppression hypothesis refers to the γ-parameters. The parameter γ0 corresponding 
to the variable DUCh relates to the relative income effect for all households living in a 
village dominated by Upper Castes (UC). The parameter γ1t (x100) corresponding to 
the variable SChxDUCh, say, is interpreted as the percentage difference in income, on 
average, between SC and UC households living in an UC dominant village. 
Without controlling for potential locational confounds, the enclave and oppression 
effects could simply pick up that, for instance, upper caste dominated villages are 
located in areas with a favorable resource base and greater agricultural potential.
26 
Another possible locational confound relates to policies and governance in the state 
where a village is located and a household resides. To address these important 
concerns, we use Palmer-Jones and Sen’s (2003) agroecological zones
27 and state 
dummy variables as controls. Both sets of variables are included in the vector of 
control variables (X) in equation (4). In addition, X includes variables for household 
                                                 
26 The relevance of locational disadvantage, which corresponds highly imperfectly with state boundaries, for 
poverty (and inequality) in rural India, has been extensively documented by Palmer-Jones and Sen (2003).  
27 Their map (Palmer-Jones and Sen (2003; 14-15) divides India into 19 different zones where very careful 
classifications of land surface capture initial conditions that indicate agricultural productivity potential.    
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demographic composition, education and land holdings, and for village infrastructure 
(the full list of variables is in Appendix 2). 
All parameters of equation (4) are allowed to vary with time which makes it 
possible to investigate changes in oppression and enclave effects between the two 
rounds and, subsequently, the implications for income growth and for poverty 
incidence and persistence. As discussed in section B, we explore the robustness of the 
main results to two alternative measures of dominance and for this purpose we replace 
the dummy dominance variables (e.g. DUC) with the upper caste land share (the first 
alternative) or the value of the dominance adjusted Herfindahl-index (the second 
alternative, eq. (3)).    
          
III DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
This section presents descriptive statistics on village regimes that are pertinent to 
the oppression and enclave hypotheses.
28 Anchored in Dumont’s (1970) conception of 
caste dominance, as set out above, our empirical focus is on villages in which a 
particular social group owns the largest proportion of village land.  
We first, however, present data on land and population dominance in the 679 
villages in our panel.   
 
Table I: The distribution of land and population dominance by village and social 
group 
  Largest land-holding group in village 
 SC ST OBC MUS UC  OTH Total 
Largest population group in village:   
Scheduled Castes (SC)  24 2 12 1 25 4 68 
Scheduled Tribes (ST)  0 65 3 0 2 0 70 
Other Backward Classes (OBC)  1 0 196 3 25 10 235 
Muslims (MUS)  0 0 2 35 4 2 43 
Upper Castes (UC)  0 1 1 0 223 6 231 
Others and none (OTH)  2 0 8 0 18 1 9 
Total 27 68 222 39 297 26 679 
                                                 
28 In a companion paper, we present other descriptive statistics for this panel including mean household income by 
state, land holdings, levels of education (of the household head), occupation and real household income per capita 
for different social groups and find a close correspondence between a priori expectations and summary statistics. 
Kerala has the highest level of household income per capita (but is represented by a small number of households in 
the panel, n=48), closely followed by Punjab and Haryana. Chhattisgarh, Assam and Orissa are the three bottom 
states. Further, marginalised social groups own less land and are less educated than others. 41% of SC households 
and 48 % of Muslim households have their own land; the figures for STs, OBC and UCs are 70%, 63% and 81%, 
respectively. One contrast between SC and Muslim households is that the latter have more irrigated land, on 
average. Apart from lower levels of education and consistent with Kijima (2006), marginalised communities also 
appear to receive lower returns on their human capital.    15
Source: HDPI panel, authors’ calculations 
Notes: Figures are number of panel villages in which the row social groups are the largest population 
group and the column social groups own the largest land share. The category “others” consists of 
villages in which either an unclassified group or no single group is land- or population-dominant. 
 
The technical challenge posed by separate identification of land and population 
dominance may be gauged from the diagonal which shows that population and land 
dominance are strongly correlated: for each social group, if it is population dominant, 
in over 90 percent of cases, it is also land dominant, and vice versa. There are two 
exceptions to this pattern – in 44 villages SCs are population, but not land-dominant. 
There are also 39 villages where OBCs are population, but not land-dominant. We 
include separate terms to capture these two exceptions in our empirical analysis 
below.  Table I shows that Upper caste dominance is the most common village 
regime, closely followed by villages dominated by OBCs. In comparison, the number 
of SC and Muslim dominated villages is relatively small.       
Table II reports the distribution of panel households across village regimes and 
illustrates the extent to which panel households are clustered in ‘own’ dominated 
villages. Such clustering, which can be read off the bold diagonal, is pronounced for 
STs, UCs, OBCs and Muslims while the SC population is more dispersed. Relevant to 
the oppression hypothesis, table II also shows the presence of panel households from 
each social group in UC-dominated villages. 46 per cent of the panel households 
residing in such villages are UCs, 26.4 per cent SCs and 21.6 per cent OBCs. STs and 
Muslims between them account for 6 percent.  
 
Table II: Number of panel households by social group and village regime 
                Land dominant social group 
  SC ST OBC MUS UC OTH Total
Social group of panel households:   
Scheduled Castes (SC)  222 68 694 109 1,040 119  2,252
Scheduled Tribes (ST)  23 552 141 21 95 3  835
Other Backward Classes (OBC)  86 169 1,608 64 852 130  2,909
Muslims (MUS)  52 10 130 337 145 25  699
Upper Castes (UC)  44 61 381 29 1,810  91 2,416
Total 427 860 2,954 560 3,942  368  9,111
Source: HDPI panel, authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 1 reports round 1 and round 2 mean household per capita incomes and poverty 
headcount by social groups for villages with (i) upper caste land dominance, (ii) own 
group land dominance and (iii) the remaining ‘other’ villages.   16
 
Figure 1: Mean income and poverty headcount by social group, round and 
village regime 
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round 1 poverty round 2 poverty
 
Source: HDPI panel, authors’ calculations 
Notes: Poverty is the share of the indicated sub-sample with income below the NSSO state-specific 
rural poverty lines. 
 
Figure 1 suggests pronounced village regime effects on income levels, growth, 
poverty incidence and the speed of poverty reduction (persistence). In round 1, SCs 
and OBCs in upper caste dominated villages have marginally higher average incomes. 
For STs, round 1 incomes outside own enclaves were notably higher.
 29 The average 
upper caste household was much better off in own enclaves, while Muslim incomes 
were roughly equivalent across village regimes. With the exception of UCs, the 
second round picture is strikingly different. STs appear to do much better in UC 
dominated villages while SCs fared much better in own enclaves. Muslims did 
marginally better in own enclaves. Contrasting this dynamism, SCs and OBCs in 
upper caste dominated villages and STs and OBCs in own enclaves made little 
progress.  
                                                 
29 Kijima (2006;370) holds unfavourable geographic location responsible for disparities between STs and other 
social groups. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) observe that districts with a high ST population have lower quality 
public goods and services such as roads, health and educational facilities.   17
 In terms of average living standard improvements, enclaves appear to favour UCs 
and SCs very strongly and Muslims marginally; STs did remarkably well in UC 
dominated villages, but made little progress overall.  
Were these average income changes confined to the better off within each social 
group or did they extend to poorer households as well?  In the first round, the 
incidence of poverty among SCs, STs, OBCs and Muslims was lower in upper caste 
dominated villages than in own enclaves. Consistent with the income growth 
observations, the most dramatic poverty reductions appear for SCs in own enclaves 
and STs in upper caste dominated villages. However, in spite of modest income rises, 
poverty reduction among Muslims in own enclaves appears dramatic. Poorer ST 
households made slightly more progress than the average ST household. Consistent 
with the income figures, OBCs seem to have experienced limited poverty reduction 
between the two rounds.  
The intricate ways in which social identity appears to interact with village regime, 
and the variations in welfare levels and changes by social group that this gives rise to, 
may not reflect oppression and enclave effects but instead be confounded by other 
factors. UC dominated villages may be clustered in areas with greater agricultural 
potential and SC dominated villages could be concentrated in states with more 
progressive policies towards Scheduled Castes or in states that experienced more (or 
less) income growth and poverty reduction after the 1991 reforms; we have already 
remarked upon the locational disadvantage of ST dominated villages.  
Once potential locational confounds have been tackled, we are in a position to 
identify externalities associated with residence in upper caste dominated villages 
along with group specific oppression and enclave effects. With respect to the former, 
the quality of schools, health care and sanitation in UC dominated villages could all 
be expected to be better.
30 In addition, lower castes may emulate upper caste 
behaviour
31 which could strengthen educational aspirations and improve farming 
practices. Having rich neighbours can make it less risky to adopt high yielding seed 
varieties since one can learn from the good and bad experiences of wealthy early 
adopters (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 1995). Such positive externalities could exist 
alongside oppression effects manifested in limitations in the access to resources or 
                                                 
30 Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) find that parliamentary constituencies with a concentration of Brahmins had 
higher level of schools and piped water in 1971.  
31  One wellknown form of emulation, ‘Sanskritisation’, refers to a low caste changing its ‘customs, ritual, 
ideology and way of life in the direction of a high, and frequently “twice-born’ caste’. (Srinivas 1966;6)      18
markets, a hostile school environment, exclusion from membership in the local dairy 
cooperative or restrictions in the access to local credit or microcredit schemes that 
facilitate taking advantage of new opportunities in the post reform era.  
By incrementally controlling for important factor endowments in our empirical 
model we obtain clues about the pathways through which each of these effects 
operate. A trivial possibility would be that SCs living in own enclaves do better 
because of larger or higher quality land endowments which directly or via more 
education could translate into higher incomes. If so, enclave coefficients should turn 
insignificant once education and household land holdings are controlled for.  
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how social identity interacted with village regime relate 
to two important factor endowments in rural India, namely basic education measured 
by male and female illiteracy and household land holdings.  
 
Figure 2: Male and female illiteracy by social group, round and village regime 
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round 1 female illiteracy round 2 female illiteracy
 
Source: HDPI panel, authors’ calculations 
Notes: 
1.  Figures are averaged across all households in the sub-sample indicated, and are based on the 
highest level of educational achievement in the household, i.e. on households of which not a 
single member is literate. 
 
Among groups with low initial male literacy (SCs, STs, Muslims), there appears to 
have been across the board improvements with Muslims and STs in own enclaves   19
making more progress than those in UC dominated villages. SCs had higher and 
Muslims lower initial male literacy in their own enclaves. Although these 
observations on educational levels and progress correspond imperfectly with the 
income and growth patterns in figure 1, they do provide hints of positive enclave level 
and growth effects for SCs. While STs in UC dominated villages experienced rapid 
income growth, male education does not appear to be behind this spur. Female STs 
experienced dramatic educational progress in general, while female SCs did better and 
female Muslims worse in own enclaves.      
 
Figure 3: Mean land holding (in acres) by social group, round and village regime 
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round 1 irrigated land round 2 irrigated land
 
Source: HDPI panel, authors’ calculations 
Notes: 
1.  All figures are in acres and averaged across the entire sub-sample indicated, i.e. including 
those who do not own/hold any land. 
2.  Irrigated land includes owned and hired land (we cannot distinguish the two)  
 
   An a priori expectation of higher average round 1 land holdings in own dominated 
villages holds for UCs, STs and Muslims (marginally). The average SC household in 
UC dominated villages possessed more land than own enclave SC households only in 
round 1. OBCs in UC dominated villages owned less land than in own enclaves but 
more land than SCs in UC dominated villages. Consistent with expectations, the 
overall distribution of land holdings show UCs as the largest landowners followed by   20
OBCs, STs, Muslims (except in UC dominated villages) and SCs. Patterns are much 
the same, although with more pronounced differences, for irrigated land.
32   
While rich, our observations so far are inconclusive about the effects of village 
regimes on income, income growth and poverty incidence and persistence; our next 
step is to implement the empirical strategy laid out in section II. 
         
IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Section A presents the estimation results, section B performs a robustness check on 
the main results and section C explores the implications of our results for the level of 
income and income growth, and for the incidence and persistence of poverty by social 
group and village regime. 
 
A. Estimation results 
       Eq. (4) is estimated for round 1 and 2 using alternative specifications where extra 
variables are gradually introduced. The estimation results for these specifications are 
reported in Tables III and IV and in full in Appendix 2. The natural logarithm of real 
household income per capita is the dependent variable.  
The first specification is a simple benchmark which contains ‘raw’ social identity 
dummy variables (SC, ST, MUS, OBC) with upper castes as benchmark category. We 
proceed by adding the enclave village regime variables capturing own group land 
dominance (SC x DSC, ST x DST, MUS x DMUS and OBC x DOBC), the two 
population (but not land) dominance dummy variables discussed in section III that we 
denote by SC x PSC and OBC x POBC, the dummy for demarcating villages with 
upper caste land dominance (DUC) and, finally, the oppression variables represented 
by the social group interaction terms with upper caste dominance. The latter facilitate 
identification of how SCs (SC x DUC), STs (ST x DUC), Muslims (MUS x DUC) 
and OBCs (OBC x DUC) perform within upper caste dominated villages compared to 
elsewhere.  
Sets of related control variables are then gradually introduced: we think of agro-
ecological zone indicators, state dummy variables and household composition 
                                                 
32 The consistent decline in land holdings, given that we are dealing with a panel, may look puzzling. Further 
disaggregation confirms this trend across states, suggesting that this is a real phenomenon. The most likely 
explanation is that in a sufficient number of first round households to affect mean values, elderly patriarchs resided 
in joint households with the oldest son (and this son’s wife and offspring). In the intermediate period, some of 
these patriarchs died – while the oldest son’s household remained intact, its land holdings was split among the 
oldest son and his siblings.      21
variables
33 as ‘pure’ controls which are added in the specifications reported on in 
Table III; village infrastructure, household education and land variables we think of as 
possible pathways through which enclave and oppression effects operate; these are 
added in the specifications reported on in Table IV. The full details are available in 
Appendix 2.
                                                 
33 While household demography may affect well-being, demographic behaviour is unlikely to be affected by 
oppression and should be controlled for to identify true enclave and oppression effects.   22
Table III Estimation results of the effects on income of social identity, village 
regime and locational and demographic controls 
Model:  Social identity terms
                   (1)  
Plus village regime  
                   (2) 
Plus controls 
(3) 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
Social identity:          
HH is SC    -0.463***  -0.607***  -0.374*** -0.510***  -0.370***  -0.455*** 
      (-20.29)      (-24.75)        (-9.40)      (-11.91)        (-9.55)      (-11.18) 
HH is ST    -0.458***  -0.601***  -0.310***   -0.462***  -0.309*** -0.374*** 
      (-12.80)      (-16.30)        (-4.57)        (-6.95)        (-4.92)        (-6.23) 
HH is OBC   -0.267***  -0.371***  -0.291***   -0.338***  -0.216*** -0.264*** 
      (-11.40)      (-14.92)        (-5.87)        (-6.09)        (-4.59)        (-5.16) 
HH is MUS   -0.406***  -0.530***  -0.289***   -0.446***  -0.201*** -0.324*** 
      (-10.81)      (-12.73)        (-4.76)        (-6.68)        (-3.35)        (-5.14) 
Village regime 
variables: 
        
SC x DSC            0.032    0.268***    0.140**    0.302*** 
        (0.48)        (3.55)        (2.18)        (4.25) 
SC x PSC      -0.031      0.062    -0.048     0.074 
            (-0.59)        (1.08)        (-0.97)        (1.43) 
ST x DST      -0.088     -0.056    -0.017    -0.001 
            (-1.22)        (-0.78)        (-0.26)        (-0.01) 
OBC x DOBC      0.170***     0.142***   0.098**    0.118*** 
            (3.58)        (2.73)        (2.21)        (2.56) 
OBC x POBC       0.000    0.156**    -0.053     0.129** 
            (0.01)        (2.30)        (-0.91)        (2.13) 
MUS x DMUS      -0.023       0.160*    -0.015     0.122 
            (-0.28)        (1.85)        (-0.20)        (1.58) 
DUC      0.202***      0.285***  0.109***    0.107*** 
            (4.20)        (5.67)        (2.32)        (2.32) 
SC x DUC      -0.113***     -0.149***  -0.082*  -0.135*** 
            (-2.30)        (-2.83)        (-1.75)        (-2.72) 
ST x DUC         -0.222**      -0.030     -0.132    -0.007 
            (-2.02)        (-0.27)        (-1.27)        (-0.07) 
MUS x DUC         -0.187**      -0.142   -0.147*    -0.079 
            (-2.11)        (-1.41)        (-1.75)        (-0.84) 
OBC x DUC      -0.024    -0.127**  -0.078    -0.116* 
            (-0.41)        (-1.99)        (-1.41)        (-1.95) 
C o n t r o l s :           
Household 
composition 
No No No No  Yes  Yes 
Agro-ecological 
zones 
No No No No  Yes  Yes 
State dummy 
variables 
No No No No  Yes  Yes 
          
R  squared  (overall)  0.0609 0.0949 0.0663 0.1065  0.2127  0.2837 
N  9111 9111 9111 9111  9111  9111 
Source: HDPI-I (“round 1”) and II (“round 2”) surveys, panel households only; authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual per capita household income in constant 1993/94 prices, with round 
2 figures converted using NSSO state-specific rural CPIs. Random effects, with standard errors that are robust to heteroske-
dasticity and clustering within villages. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively; robust t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Demographic controls are the sex of the household head, number of boys aged 0-5, girls 0-5, boys 6-14, males 
15-19, females 15-19, males 20-24, females 20-24, males 25-49, females 25-49, males 50-59, females 50-59, males 60 and older, 
and females 60 and older. See table A2.1 in Appendix 2 for the full specification.   
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 Table III is laid out to facilitate round 1 and round 2 comparisons. We first report 
broad patterns of identity-based disparities highlighting changes between round 1 and 
2. We then briefly consider the enclave and oppression coefficients before and after 
introducing locational controls. We finally focus on the latter enclave and oppression 
effects and the pathways through which they operate.   
Column 1 presents the relative magnitude of the raw social identity coefficients 
for SC, ST, MUS and OBC households, which are all significant at the 1 percent 
level. In both rounds, SCs and STs are, on average, the relatively most disadvantaged, 
having incomes compared to UCs that are about 46 percent lower in round 1 and 60 
percent lower in round 2. Muslims are slightly better off with, on average, a 41 
percent lower income in round 1 and a 53 percent lower income in round 2 than UCs, 
while OBCs, on average, are well ahead of the other three groups. On average, OBCs 
have a 27 percent lower income in round 1 and a 37 percent lower income in round 2 
than UCs. Upper caste households are, in general, and in line with a priori 
expectations, much better off than everyone else. The raw coefficients also suggest 
that the disparity between upper castes and each of the other social groups widened 
between the two rounds.  
In columns (2) and (3) the village regime variables interacted with households’ 
social group are introduced, first without and then with control variables added. Prior 
to adding agroecological, state and household demographic controls, it would appear 
that residing in an upper caste dominated village not only is advantageous for upper 
caste households but bestows sizeable positive externalities on other social groups. 
The coefficient corresponding to DUC, which is statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level, leaps notably in size between the two rounds. We also observe negative 
and statistically significant round 1 interaction terms (‘oppression coefficients’) for 
SCs, STs and Muslims. Further, the oppression effect disappears for STs and Muslims 
and becomes significant for OBCs in round 2.  
For SCs we find a large and strongly significant positive enclave effect in round 2. 
The round 2 enclave effect for Muslims is weaker. In addition, significant enclave 
coefficients for OBCs appear in both rounds.  
The responses of the ‘raw’ identity and village regime coefficients to the step-wise 
introduction of each of the three sets of ‘pure’ controls may be gauged in full in table 
A2.1 in Appendix 2. Adding Palmer-Jones and Sen’s (2003) agroecological zone 
indicators shows that the positive externality associated with residing in an upper   24
caste dominated village does have a locational dimension. While remaining strongly 
significant, coefficient sizes are sharply reduced. Introducing state dummy variables 
further reduces size and eliminates the gap between round 1 and 2.  
At the same time, and with one notable exception, both the size and statistical 
significance of the oppression effects remain intact; the coefficient for STs in UC 
dominated villages drops out. It is also clear that the key enclave coefficients are not 
locationally confounded. OBCs do better in their own enclaves in both rounds, while 
SCs do much better in their own enclaves in both rounds but especially in round 2. 
However, the weaker round 2 enclave effect for Muslims turns insignificant. 
     The  precise  implications  of  the  positive externality and of the oppression and 
enclave effects for income levels, growth and poverty incidence and persistence are 
brought out in the computations and discussions of counterfactual income, growth and 
poverty in subsection C below.  
      These, our main results, may be qualitatively summarised as follows. UCs earn 
higher incomes than others in both rounds. In addition, UCs in own dominated 
villages perform better than other UCs. There is, moreover, a general and strong 
positive externality associated with residence in upper caste dominated villages. The 
coefficient on DUC is significant at the 1 percent level and of similar size in round 1 
and 2. For the oppression coefficients, we observe that while Muslims and SCs did 
worse in UC dominated villages in round 1, SC disadvantage within such villages 
intensified while Muslims within such villages progressed in the post reform years. 
OBCs in UC dominated villages were also at a disadvantage in round 2, but less so 
than SCs. Further, OBCs and, in particular, SCs do far better in own dominated 
villages in both rounds, but with the enclave effect in SC-dominated villages leaping 
dramatically in the post reform era. Overall, our results suggest more pronounced 
disadvantage for SCs and OBCs in upper caste dominated villages post reform and 
stronger enclave effects for SCs in round 2. One possible explanation is that it is in 
enclaves, where discrimination by powerful groups is less likely, that marginalised 
groups faced fewer obstacles in the access to markets and that such access gained in 
importance in the post reform years.  
We next focus on the pathways through which oppression and enclave effects 
operate and of possible change in the post reform era. We gradually control for village 
infrastructure, for household education and household land holdings with results 
reported in full in table IV.    25
Table IV Estimation results of the effects on income of social identity, village 
regime and additional controls: village infrastructure, household education and 
land  
Controls added:  Village infrastructure  Plus education (hh)  Plus land (hh) 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
Social identity:        
HH is SC    -0.369***  -0.452***  -0.245*** -0.321*** -0.154*** -0.252*** 
        (-9.56)      (-11.07)        (-6.58)        (-8.23)        (-4.49)        (-6.81) 
HH is ST    -0.311***  -0.374***  -0.172*** -0.234*** -0.152*** -0.203*** 
        (-4.95)        (-6.17)        (-2.81)        (-4.09)        (-2.72)        (-3.64) 
HH is OBC    -0.21***  -0.259***  -0.141*** -0.181*** -0.129*** -0.148*** 
        (-4.45)        (-5.05)        (-3.08)        (-3.70)        (-3.12)        (-3.25) 
HH is MUS   -0.208***  -0.324***   -0.113**  -0.217***    -0.065  -0.140*** 
        (-3.48)        (-5.12)        (-1.98)        (-3.59)        (1.23)        (-2.38) 
Village  regime:        
SC x DSC    0.131**  0.289***    0.123**  0.253***     0.06  0.205*** 
        (2.05)        (4.03)        (2.01)        (3.64)        (1.05)        (3.16) 
SC x PSC    -0.035      0.076    -0.053     0.07    -0.062      0.059 
        (-0.72)        (1.44)        (1.08)        (1.39)        (1.34)        (1.23) 
ST x DST     0.008      0.019    -0.006     0.005     0.012     -0.012 
        (0.12)        (0.31)        (0.10)        (0.08)        (0.22)        (0.22) 
OBC x DOBC   0.095**   0.115***   0.094**   0.097**  0.067*      0.05 
        (2.15)        (2.49)        (2.16)        (2.19)        (1.73)        (1.21) 
OBC x POBC    -0.059    0.134**    -0.044  0.118*    -0.012      0.106** 
        (-1.00)        (2.20)        (-0.77)        (1.98)        (-0.23)        (1.98) 
MUS x DMUS     0.003  0.147*     0.006  0.15**    -0.048  0.087 
        (0.04)        (1.88)        (0.08)        (2.01)        (-0.73)        (1.21) 
DUC   0.116***     0.107**    0.124***  0.105***     0.035  0.024 
        (2.48)        (2.30)        (2.76)        (2.36)        (0.89)        (0.57) 
SC x DUC   -0.09*   -0.14***   -0.107***   -0.15***     0.01  -0.045 
        (-1.92)        (-2.81)        (-2.39)        (-3.17)        (0.24)        (-1.01) 
ST x DUC   -0.14    -0.01    -0.129  0.017    -0.032   0.112 
        (-1.35)        (-0.10)        (-1.27)        (0.18)        (-0.36)        (1.26) 
MUS x DUC   -0.15*    -0.094    -0.129  -0.054     0.026   0.003 
        (-1.79)        (-0.99)        (-1.58)        (-0.58)        (0.34)        (0.03) 
OBC x DUC   -0.091  -0.123**    -0.085  -0.113**     0.076   0.001 
        (-1.64)        (-2.07)        (-1.59)        (-1.99)        (1.59)        (0.01) 
Controls:        
Household  composition  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agro-ecological  zones  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village  infrastructure  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household  education  No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household  land  No  No  No  No Yes Yes 
        
R  squared  (overall)  0.2252 0.2877 0.2700 0.3413 0.4258 0.4181 
N  9111 9111 9111 9111 9111 9111 
Source and Notes: as for Table IV 
Additional notes: Education variables are dummy variables used as controls for the highest level of male and female education in 
the household. Land refers to controls for the logarithm of owned household land measured in acres, and the logarithm of 
irrigated household land measured in acres. Village size is captured by village population (logarithm). The village infrastructure 
controls are the presence within the village of a busstop (1), or within its vicinity of a railway station (2), medical clinic (3), 
schools, and if so, at which level of education (4), or a market/mandi (5), as well as the type of road (footpath only, kutcha road, 
pucca road) that leads to the village (6).  The full specification is reported in table A2.2 in Appendix 2.   26
 
Adding the village infrastructure controls detailed in the note to table IV has a 
close to negligible effect both on the raw identity and village regime coefficients. On 
the face of it and contrary to received wisdom (e.g Binstrup Andersen and Shimokawa 
2006), the scope for reducing identity based disadvantage by improving village 
infrastructure appears more limited than expected. It is, however, quite possible that 
upper caste land dominance is correlated with better quality village infrastructure and 
that one reason for why village infrastructure variables perform so badly elsewhere 
reflects such a quality difference.    
In line with Kijima (2006) and to shed light on the role of human capital 
endowment differences, we introduce dummies for the maximum female and male 
education within a household where the educational categories are up to primary, 
middle, matriculation, higher secondary and graduate plus. A hypothesis resonating 
with Dercon and Krishnan’s (2007) findings would be that social identity disparities – 
by caste or religion – should be wiped out once educational attainments are controlled 
for. For both rounds, we note the marked reductions in the raw identity coefficients 
and thus in the relative disadvantage of SCs, STs, Muslims and OBCs from adding 
educational controls. For STs, the raw coefficient drops from -0.31 to -0.17 or by 
around 45 per cent. For SCs, in comparison, education nets out about 33 percent of 
the remaining disadvantage vis-à-vis upper caste households. Our results concur with 
Dercon and Krishnan (2007) in suggesting that education is crucial: at the same time, 
our findings suggest that education is only part of the story.   
Turning to the oppression and enclave effects, controlling for household education 
turns the weak round 1 oppression coefficient for Muslims insignificant, while the 
oppression coefficient for SCs is notably reinforced. We next consider land holdings 
as potential oppression buffer and asset contributing to enclave advantage. In contrast 
to Dercon and Krishnan (2007), land appears to hold the key to eliminating 
oppression associated with upper caste dominance. Once household land (the natural 
logarithm of the acres of land owned by the household, and all the household’s 
irrigated land) is controlled for, the positive village externality and all identity specific 
oppression effects are wiped out in both rounds. The interpretation is as follows: the 
positive externality from residence in upper caste villages essentially accrues to 
landholding households. Further, what one may think of as the ‘traditional’ and 
additional burden imposed on SC and OBC households from residing in upper caste   27
dominated villages could, both past and post reform, be eliminated through land 
redistribution. Land reform would thus wipe out the separate effect on income of 
upper caste oppression, leaving no residual effect of such oppression in any other 
markets or transactions. Crucially, however, this does not imply that all identity based 
rural disadvantage will be eliminated, since the raw coefficients, with the exception of 
Muslims in round 1, remain stubborn and statistically significant. In other words, even 
after location, demography, village infrastructure and factor endowments are carefully 
controlled for, the raw coefficients suggest that SCs with a similar resource base and 
attributes as others not only remain the worst off but have fallen further behind STs 
and OBCs in the post reform years. One important exception is SCs residing in own 
enclaves; the SC enclave coefficient remains large and strongly significant after land 
holdings and all other controls are added and is large enough to eliminate 80 percent 
of the remaining disadvantage vis-à-vis UC households. Notice that Muslims have 
also experienced a post-reform setback.    
  
B.  Robustness tests  
 
As discussed in section II, we conduct two robustness tests on our main results to 
respond to potential reservations about the sociological foundation of our main 
dominance measure. The first robustness test replaces the dummy variables for upper 
caste and own group land dominance with the share of village land owned by the 
dominant group, since power may depend on the concentration of land ownership and 
thus how much land the dominant group owns. The second robustness test replaces 
the dummy variables for land dominance with fragmentation adjusted dominance 
measure defined by equation (3), since not only the share of land owned by the 
dominant group but also the extent to which the power base represented by the land 
ownership of other groups is fragmented could matter. Table V reports the sign and 
the level of significance on the estimated parameters of interest to the oppression and 
enclave hypothesis in the specification with ‘pure’ control variables only (AEZs, state 
dummy variables and household demographic controls).
34  
                                                 
34 We also ran regressions using alternative dominance measures for each specification reported on in Tables III 
and IV and Appendix 2, and obtained very similar results in terms of broad comparability with specifications using 
our main dominance measure to those reported here. These additional results are all available on request.    28
The round 1 results for these alternative specifications are in the top half of Table 
V and the round 2 results in the bottom half. 17 out of the 22 coefficients (11 per 
round) on the village regime variables when using the land dominance dummy are 
robust in terms of retaining sign and statistical significance (or insignificance, as the 
case may be) regardless of which alternative dominance measure is used.
35 It is also 
noteworthy that significance of coefficients is generally stronger for the more refined 
dominance measures, especially for those capturing oppression.  
Exploiting the panel dimension of our dataset, we also investigated whether 
changes in coefficients on village regime variables between rounds were statistically 
significant, for each of the specifications reported in Tables III and IV and Appendix 
2, and then each time for each of our three dominance measures, in regressions of the 
change in the natural logarithm of real per capita income on these variables and the 
appropriate set of controls. The intensifying enclave effect for SCs is statistically 
significant, for each dominance measure, and that for OBCs and Muslims only when 
we use the more refined measures. Changes in oppression coefficients are generally 
not significant which is consistent with our main results for STs in UC dominated 
villages and SCs in UC dominated villages. For the latter, non-significance in the 
growth regression is the equivalent of no change in the level oppression coefficient 
between the two rounds.  
  
                                                 
35 The five coefficients that do not retain either (in)significance or their sign are ST x DST in round 2, OBC x 
DOBC in round 1, MUS x DMUS in round 2, ST x DUC in round 1 and OBC x DUC in round 1.   29





Land percentage of 
largest land holding 
group in village 
Dominance-adjusted 
Herfindahl index (eq. 
3) 
Round 1     
SC  x  DSC  ++ +++ ++ 
SC  x  PSC  Ns Ns Ns 
ST  x  DST  Ns Ns Ns 
OBC x DOBC  ++  Ns  Ns 
OBC x POBC  Ns  Ns  Ns 
MUS x DMUS  Ns  Ns  Ns 
DUC  +++ +++ +++ 
SC x DUC  -  ---  --- 
ST x DUC  Ns  -  - 
MUS x DUC  -  ---  -- 
OBC x DUC  Ns  ---  --- 
Round 2     
SC  x  DSC  +++ +++ +++ 
SC  x  PSC  Ns Ns Ns 
ST x  DST  Ns  Ns  -- 
OBC x DOBC  +++  +++  +++ 
OBC x POBC  ++  ++  + 
MUS x DMUS  Ns  +  + 
DUC  +++ +++ +++ 
SC x DUC  ---  ---  --- 
ST  x  DUC  Ns Ns Ns 
MUS x DUC  Ns  Ns  Ns 
OBC x DUC  --  -  --- 
Notes:   +++, ++, + indicates positive coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, ---, --, - 
indicates negative coefficient significant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively, Ns indicates not significant, all 
in the specification with social group, village regime,  agro-ecological zones, state dummies and 
household demographic composition variables.  
   
C.  Magnitude of enclave and oppression effects 
 
      We next explore the order of magnitude of the enclave and oppression effects in 
terms of income, income growth, and the incidence and persistence of poverty. We do 
so by computing counterfactual income as if the significant coefficients on the social 
identity times village regime variables were equal to zero and use the coefficients 
from our model that includes AEZ, state dummies and household demographic 
controls. The enclave and oppression effects quantified here may be interpreted as 
aggregate effects, summed across all markets (and public services). We restrict the 
analysis to statistically significant enclave and oppression effects.  
   30
Table VI: Actual and counterfactual income, growth and poverty without village 
regime effects by social group 























            
Upper-caste dominated 
villages  
          
Mean income per capita            
Actual  6,395 7,391 6,760 8,905  8,309    9,200  6,626  7,915 
Counterfactual – without 
general village regime effect 
5,735 6,641 6,062 8,002 7,451      8,266 5,942 7,112 
Counterfactual – without 
oppression effect 
6,941 8,460 6,760 8,905 8,309 10,331  7,675  7,915 
Counterfactual – without 
general village regime and 
oppression effects 
6,225 7,601 6,062 8,002 7,451      9,283 6,883 7,112 
Growth in mean income per 
capita (% per year between 
1994 and 2005) 
          
Actual  - 1.3  - 2.5  -  0.9  - 1.6 
Counterfactual – without 
general village regime effect 
- 1.3  - 2.6  -  0.9  - 1.6 
Counterfactual – without 
oppression effect 
- 1.8  - 2.5  -  2.0  - 0.3 
Counterfactual – without 
general village regime and 
oppression effects 
- 1.8  - 2.6  -  2.0  - 0.3 
Poverty headcount (%)            
Actual 43.9  35.4  46.3  33.7 30.8  27.7  35.9 33.1 
Counterfactual – without 
general village regime effect 
49.9 42.0 51.6 41.1 35.8 32.4 44.8  40.0 
Counterfactual – without 
oppression effect 
38.7 29.9 46.3 33.7 30.8 22.9 29.0  33.1 
Counterfactual – without 
general village regime and 
oppression effects 
45.7 34.3 51.6 41.1 35.8 27.5 33.1  40.0 
            
Own-group dominated villages             
Mean income per capita            
Actual 5,954  9,842  5,331  5,805 8,158  9,187  6,553 8,231 
Counterfactual – without 
enclave effect 
5,176 7,276 5,331 5,805 7,397 8,164 6,553  8,231 
Growth in mean income per 
capita (% per year between 
1994 and 2005) 
          
Actual  - 4.7  - 0.8  -  1.1  - 2.1 
Counterfactual – without 
enclave effect 
- 3.1  - 0.8  -  0.9  - 2.1 
Poverty  headcount  (%)           
Actual 52.3  29.7  50.9  47.1 34.8  30.2  51.0 37.1 
Counterfactual – without 
enclave effect 
59.9 47.7 50.9 47.1 39.9 37.7 51.0  37.1 
Notes: counterfactual figures are all based on counterfactual income computed for each household in 
villages land dominated by indicated group, using significant coefficients from the round 1 and round 2 
regressions of the natural logarithm of income on village regime and social identity variables, 
controlling for agro-ecological zones, state dummies, and household demographic characteristics, as 
reported in the last column of Table 3 and in full in Appendix 2.  
 
For round 1 and 2 income per capita and poverty, and annual income growth between 
the two rounds, Table VI reports, by marginalised group, actual and counterfactual   31
figures, separately for upper-caste dominated villages and for own-group dominated 
villages. For the last-mentioned villages, counterfactual figures are based on what 
these variables would have been without the estimated enclave effect. For the first-
mentioned villages, three sets of counterfactual figures are reported. First, income, 
growth and poverty are computed as if there is no general village regime effect (the 
coefficient on DUC); next as if there is no group specific oppression effect (e.g. the 
coefficient on SC x DUC); and finally as if there is neither effect. So, for example, 
mean income per capita in round 1 for SCs living in UC-dominated villages is equal 
to 6,359 Rupees. Had they not benefited from the general village regime effect, it 
would have been 5,735 Rupees; had they not suffered from oppression, it would have 
been 6,941 Rupees; and if neither effect had been at work, it would have been 6,225 
Rupees. The last figure is lower than their actual mean income, which shows that, in 
this case, the positive village regime effect is larger (in absolute terms) than the 
negative oppression effect. 
The general village regime effect on income of marginalised groups living in UC-
dominated villages is always about 10 percent, both in round 1 and in round 2: mean 
income would thus have been some 10 percent lower were it not for this effect. Since 
the effect on income is approximately the same size in both rounds, the effect on 
growth is negligible. The effect on the headcount percentage of poverty, on the other 
hand, depends on the group specific distribution of income in the vicinity of the 
poverty line. Muslims in round 1 benefited most and OBCs in round 2 least: poverty 
would have been 8.9 percentage points higher for the former and 4.7 percentage 
points higher for the latter, were it not for the general village regime effect. 
The group specific oppression effect on income of living in UC-dominated 
villages, when statistically significant, tends to be larger than the general village 
regime effect, with one exception (SCs in round 1). Income in such villages would 
have been 14.4 percent higher for SCs in round 2, 12.3 percent higher for OBCs in 
round 2, and 15.8 percent higher for Muslims in round 1. The effect on growth is 
pronounced, too. SCs would have experienced 1.8 instead of 1.3 percent annual 
growth (22 percent over the entire period instead of 15 percent) and OBCs 2.0 instead 
of 0.9 percent (24 instead of 10 percent), were it not for oppression. Although the 
oppression effect dominates the general village regime effect for income, this is not 
always the case for poverty, which must be related to peculiarities of the PDF of 
income. It is worth noting, though, that poverty reduction would have been about 8   32
instead of 3 percentage points for OBCs, were it not for oppression – SCs would have 
experienced about the same amount of poverty reduction as they experienced actually, 
because the level effect in both rounds was of the same order of magnitude. 
Enclave effects in the specification used are significant only for SCs and OBCs, in 
both rounds. For OBCs they are of the same order of magnitude (but positive) as the 
oppression effects remarked on above for this group. For SCs they are much larger. 
Income per capita would have been 13.1 percent lower in round 1, and 26.1 percent 
lower in round 2, annual growth 1.6 percentage points lower (20 percent less growth 
over the period), and poverty 7.6 and 18 percentage points lower in round 1 and round 
2, were it not for the enclave effect. Poverty would have been far more persistent for 
SCs in own-dominated villages in the absence of this effect. 
In summary, we find sizeable general village regime effects that benefit those 
residing in UC-dominated villages for income and poverty (but not for growth and 
poverty reduction), and for SCs in both rounds, for OBCs in round 2 and for Muslims 
in round 1 an offsetting oppression effect of the same order of magnitude, although 
typically larger in absolute terms than the general village regime effect in the case of 
income and slightly smaller in the case of poverty. Growth for SCs and OBCs is 
substantially negatively affected by oppression. Enclave effects are large and positive 
for OBCs and especially SCs in terms of income and the absence of poverty, and for 
SCs in terms of growth, too. 
 
V CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Using a unique panel data set for rural India covering the years 1993/94 and 
2004/05, we tested the hypothesis that disadvantaged groups (Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribes, Muslims and OBCs) fare worse in terms of income levels when 
residing in villages dominated by upper castes and whether the same groups fare 
better or worse in own dominated villages. Our results provide strong support for the 
‘oppression’ hypothesis and for the positive enclave hypothesis. In addition, and for 
all social groups, a considerable positive externality from residing in upper caste 
dominated villages was uncovered.  
       The quantitative effects on income levels, growth, poverty incidence and poverty 
persistence were discerned. The income levels of SCs living in upper caste dominated 
villages would have been 8.5 percent higher in round 1 and 14.4 percent higher in   33
round 2 in the absence of oppression effects, while annual income growth would have 
been 0.5 percentage points higher, 1.8 instead of 1.3 percent. Further, the poverty 
incidence would have been more than 5 percentage points lower.  
       The negative ‘enclave’ hypothesis advances the view that the slow progress of 
marginalised communities, rather than being attributable to external oppression, may 
be caused by factors internal to the community itself. In tune with Anderson’s (2005) 
findings for Yadavs in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, but in our case extending to 
marginalised groups below the pollution barrier, Scheduled Caste households in own 
dominated villages experienced much more rapid poverty reduction between the two 
rounds. In round 2, their income is 26.1 percent higher than it would have been 
without the enclave effect, and their incidence of poverty 18 percentage points lower, 
29.7 instead of 47.7 percent. 
      While our enclave results contrast with Munshi and Rosenzweig’s (2006) findings 
from Mumbai, the magnitude of the raw social identity coefficients highlight the 
persistence of identity based disparities in rural India; whereas upper caste 
‘oppression’ has contributed substantially to prolong poverty and to low income 
among SC and OBC households there are, at the same time, significant positive 
externalities associated with living in upper caste dominated villages.    
      We  also  shed  new  light  on  the  routes through which the welfare disparities 
between different social groups within and outside villages dominated by upper castes 
may be closed. Educational attainment, while generally important and emphasised by 
other studies, matters outside UC dominated villages. Overall, however, the old recipe 
of land redistribution holds the key to neutralising disparities attributable to upper 
caste dominance. This is in notable contrast to Dercon and Krishnan’s (2007) finding 
using the ICRISAT-data set which concluded that caste based disadvantages 
essentially have educational origins. 
Our findings go further and show that once all factor endowment differences are 
controlled for, the round 1 gap between SCs, STs and OBCs dramatically narrows. 
However, even after location, demography, village infrastructure and factor 
endowments are carefully controlled for, the raw coefficients suggest that SCs with a 
similar resource base and attributes as others not only remained the worst off but fell 
further behind STs and OBCs in the post reform years. The latter provides a useful 
empirical corrective to accounts suggestive of sustained SC progress relative to other   34
groups.
36 The notable exception is SCs residing in own enclaves; the SC enclave 
coefficient remains large and strongly significant after land holdings and all other 
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APPENDIX I: The construction of social group variables to capture caste dominance.  
 
The village and household questionnaires contain data on three classifications of social groups, 
firstly and most disaggregated by jati
37 [and name of tribe] (C1) (for Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and STs), 
secondly by five broad categories (C2), namely Brahmin, OBC (Other backward classes), SC (Scheduled 
Caste), ST (Scheduled Tribe) and Other and finally by eight religious categories (C3), Hindu, Muslim, 
Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Tribal and Other. The village questionnaire also contains information on the 
most (upto eight) numerous jatis, the percentage of the village population each of these jatis represent, and 
the percent of village land owned by each of these same jatis.  
The oppression hypothesis is founded on the notion of (upper) caste dominance. If restricted to 
ritual rank, a simple and narrow definition would be to limit the upper caste label to Brahmins. Notions of 
upper caste advantage (and dominance) do, however, stretch beyond this top layer of the varna 
hierarchy.
38,39 A pragmatic alternative would be to add the “Other” category from the household 
questionnaire; the combination Brahmin (C2) plus “Other (C2)” and Hindu (C3) would then represent a 
broad definition of upper caste Hindus.  
There are, however, important problems associated with the latter option; Firstly, the exclusive 
focus on Hindus would miss out on social groups that may be in a position to wield considerable power and 
influence but who belong to a different faith. To illustrate, some of the numerically important jatis in the 
panel transcend religious boundaries; in Punjab and as footnote 17 in the main text illustrates, there are 
significant numbers of Sikh and Hindu Jat households and Sikh and Hindu Dalit households with recent 
and violent inter-caste strife in Punjab involving Jat and Dalit Sikhs.
40 For Muslims and also noted in 
footnote 17, Fuller (1996) and other contributors to the same volume contend that while caste-like 
arrangements are common, few within the Muslim community admit to their existence. In spite of social 
ranks among Muslims, the much less accurate reporting of the social groups that Muslim panel households 
belong to, left no other option but to define Muslim households by their religion alone. A similar strategy 
was adopted for Scheduled Tribes. Although the tribe a household belongs is accurately reported, 
ethnographic evidence is not supportive of local hierarchies; STs are thus a single social category in our 
analysis.  
Secondly, the process of “de-Sanskritisation”, whereby social groups lobby to downgrade their 
official status in order to avail of reservation benefits has the implication that the definitions of forward 
castes that anthropologists and sociologists, informed by careful field observations, subscribe to, are 
increasingly at odds with official and survey data social group categories. The implementation of the 
                                                 
37 Sub-caste.  
38 In addition, the prevalence of Brahmin households varies across regions. 
39 Even among Brahmins there are, of course, more fine-tuned internal rankings – Gouda Saraswath or Konkani 
Brahmins, who are fish eating residents of Karnataka’s Coastal belt, have lower social status locally than the strictly 
vegetarian Madhwa or Udupi Brahmins.   
40See  http://hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2013/stories/20030704002703900.htm. Punjab is also the state with the highest 
percentage of Scheduled Castes in its population (28.9 % according to Census of India 2001). See Jodhka (2004) for 
more on Sikhism and caste.     39
Mandal Commission’s (1978-80) recommendations added fresh impetus to reservations as political 
battleground and in the current political climate, it is not unusual to interpret the absence of ‘backward’ 
status as evidence of a social group’s limited political clout. Examples of important groups who have 
acquired OBC status, include the ‘clean-caste’ Vokkaligas, the dominant peasant caste in Central and 
Southern Karnataka (e.g. Srinivas 1978; Scarlett Epstein et al. 1998), the ritually superior Lingayats in the 
same state (Bayly 1999; 294) and more recently the Jats  in Uttar Pradesh (e. g. Jeffrey 2001) and 
Rajasthan; official status is therefore, in important instances, a reflection of political opportunism aimed at 
placating major vote banks having the unfortunate side effect of diluting official status as indicator of ritual 
status.
41  
Other variations in caste status are found at the lower end: Nuniyas and Dhanuks, who are OBCs 
in Uttar Pradesh, have Scheduled Caste status in West-Bengal. Dhobis (washermen), have SC status in 
some states but not in others. For jatis traditionally concentrated in the most degrading occupations, like 
leatherworkers (e.g. Chamars) and sweepers (e.g. Balmikis), SC status is less variant to state boundaries.  
Further, social groups that are not OBC, SC or ST should necessarily be treated as upper castes for 
analytical purposes. There are intermediate social groups in many regions for whom a more fine tuned 
distinction is desirable. Rods, an important agricultural caste in Haryana, is classified as ‘other’ and thus 
forward officially and in the household questionnaire; this does not square with anthropological field 
observations (Prem Chowdhry, pers comm.). Further, and in tune with the Mandal commission’s view and 
report, important agricultural castes such as the Kurmis of North and Kunbis of Central India do not enjoy 
the same local status as Jats and Marathas, respectively (Singh 1992; 41). For the former two, the OBC 
classification is therefore appropriate.  
In our interpretation of upper caste which is informed by anthropological observations, it is 
possible for a social group to fit the upper caste definition in some states, but not in others. The adopted 
approach may therefore be described as adhering to ritual rank as far as the top and bottom layer is 
concerned, but to disconnect, whenever appropriate and for reasons already mentioned, from official 
categories for the more fluid middle layer. While this imposes an extra work burden, it is vital to sharply 
distinguish our present and small-scale endeavour from past efforts to develop extensive caste rankings for 
rural India. British colonial administrators have subsequently been caricatured for believing in the 
possibility of such a task which at the time paved the way for an obsession with caste and jati among late 
Victorian data collectors (Bayly 1999, chapter 3). For North-India, our classification of the most important 
and by far the most numerous groups (as well as households in our panel) is entirely consistent with the 
Mandal Commission’s views: according to which the following broad groups should be treated as forward 
or upper castes; Brahmins, Rajputs, Kayasthas, Jats, Marathas and Banias (Singh 1992; 41).                 
                                                 
41 While de-Sanskritisation so far has tended to involve attempts to attain OBC-status, recent agitations by the Gujjar-
community based on comparisons with the Meena community in Rajasthan aimed to downgrade their official status 
from OBC to ST. Similarly, in an article on UP politics, the Deccan Herald (4 March 2008), listed a number of groups 
whose official status were proposed ‘downgraded’ from OBC to SC.     40
Turning to the data, the easier ones to categorise are Brahmins who mostly but not always are 
described as Brahmins. Tiwari, Sharma, Tripathi, Mishra, Koshik (MP), Padhi (O), Iyer (TN) are examples 
of others. Categorisation of Jats and Marathas and for most of the time Rajputs ( Thakurs) is 
straightforward, as are Banias (Agarwals, Guptas etc). The state-wise official lists of STs, SCs and OBCs 
provide a rich source of information and were extensively consulted to cross check the SC and ST 
classifications in the raw data.    
           Table A1 provides a listing of upper castes based on our definition and begins with all India upper 
caste jatis; these are classified as upper castes in all states. The state listing provides additional upper caste 
jatis, which are either sub-groups of the main jatis (Jats or Rajputs, say) or belong to a different upper caste 
social group (e.g Mahajan; Leva Patel). Note that the following list is based exclusively on jatis that  
feature in the panel data set/village level social composition data. If a state is not listed (e.g. Maharashtra), 
all upper caste groups in that state are included in the ALL INDIA row. Notice also that the jatis in the 
ALL India row are by far the most numerous in the North. A careful reader may also notice that while 
Andhra castes and Kerala Nayars are included in Tamil Nadu, this is not the case the other way around. 
This is a co-incidence – there are no upper caste households from Tamil Nadu amongst our Andhra Pradesh 
panel households.       
 Upper  castes 
ALL INDIA  Brahmin, Bhumihar, Rajput (general, Thakur), 
Kayastha, Kshatriya, Khatri, Maratha, Jat (Sikh and 
Hindu), Bania (Agarwal, Gupta, Jaiswal) (plus 
equivalents in the South: Vysya in Andhra Pradesh, 
Chettiar in Tamil Nadu) 
ADDITIONAL BY STATE   
Himachal Pradesh  Rajput (Suniar), Choudhary  
Punjab  Rajput (Suniar), Kamboj (Sikh), Choudhary, 
Mahant (Sikh), Arora, Ahluwalia, Mahajan, Sood, 
Visnoi 
Uttaranchal  Rana 
Haryana  Rajput (Chauhan, Bishnoi), Jat (Jhangi), Kamboj 
(Sikh)   
Rajasthan  Choudhary, Mahajan 
Gujarat  Patel (general, Patidar, Leva, Kadava), Rajput 
(Jadeja [Chandravanshi], Parmar, Solanki), Darbar 
Uttar Pradesh  Rajput (Chauhan, Negi [Gharwali]), Srivastava, 
Choudhary 
West Bengal  Pokhrel, Dahal, Chettri, Mahishya, Sadgop, Roy 
Orissa  Patnaik (general, Karan), Pradhan, Khandayat, 
Odia, Kalandi 
Madhya Pradesh  Jat (Tomar), Choudhary, Maharaj 
Andhra Pradesh  Reddy, Kapu [Balija, Telaga], Kamma [Naidu], 
Velama, Chowdary, Rajulu 
Karnataka  Lingayat, Vokkaliga    
Tamil Nadu  Mudaliar, Maravar, Vellalar, Nayar, Reddy, Naidu, 
Kamma Naidu 
Kerala  Nayar (Nair) 
 Appendix 2 
Table A2.1 Estimation results of the effects on income of social identity, village regime and demographic and locational controls 
Model:  Social identity terms  Plus village regime  Plus agro-ecological zones  Plus state dummies  Plus demographic controls 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
  b T b t  b t  b t  b t  b t  b t b t  b t  b t 
Social identity:                       
SC  -0.463 -20.29 -0.607 -24.75 -0.374    -9.4  -0.51  -11.91 -0.381  -9.55 -0.517 -12.13 -0.384 -9.61 -0.519 -12.21  -0.37  -9.55 -0.455 -11.18 
ST  -0.458   -12.8  -0.601   -16.3  -0.31  -4.57 -0.462  -6.95 -0.296  -4.44 -0.423  -6.41 -0.295 -4.42 -0.442  -6.77 -0.309  -4.92 -0.374 -6.23 
OBC  -0.267   -11.4  -0.371 -14.92 -0.291  -5.87 -0.338  -6.09 -0.263  -5.38 -0.319  -5.81 -0.256 -5.23 -0.312  -5.79 -0.216  -4.59 -0.264 -5.16 
MUS  -0.406 -10.81 -0.53  -12.73 -0.289  -4.76 -0.446  -6.68 -0.269    -4.4  -0.439  -6.58 -0.276 -4.49 -0.466  -7.12 -0.201  -3.35 -0.324 -5.14 
Village regime:                        
SC  X  DSC          0.032  0.48 0.268  3.55 0.099  1.46 0.259  3.46 0.111 1.66 0.282  3.83  0.14  2.18 0.302  4.25 
SC X PSC          -0.031  -0.59  0.062  1.08  -0.032   -0.6  0.059  1.06  -0.052  -0.99  0.048  0.87  -0.048  -0.97  0.074  1.43 
ST  X  DST          -0.088  -1.22 -0.056  -0.78 -0.055  -0.79 -0.023  -0.33 -0.049 -0.69 -0.002  -0.04 -0.017  -0.26 -0.001  -0.01 
OBC  X  DOBC          0.17  3.58 0.142  2.73 0.133  2.87 0.124  2.46 0.122 2.65 0.121  2.45 0.098  2.21 0.118  2.56 
OBC X POBC          0  0.01  0.156    2.3  -0.042  -0.68  0.123  1.84  -0.058  -0.94  0.128  1.98  -0.053  -0.91  0.129  2.13 
MUS  X  DMUS          -0.023  -0.28 0.16  1.85  -0.063  -0.79 0.084  0.98  -0.052 -0.65 0.101  1.23  -0.015  -0.2 0.122  1.58 
DUC          0.202      4.2 0.285 5.67  0.128 2.63  0.176 3.47  0.116  2.39  0.112    2.3 0.109 2.32  0.107 2.32 
SC  X  DUC          -0.113    -2.3  -0.149  -2.83 -0.108  -2.21 -0.137  -2.62 -0.103 -2.09 -0.135  -2.59 -0.082  -1.75 -0.135  -2.72 
ST X DUC          -0.222  -2.02  -0.03  -0.27  -0.234   -2.2  -0.047  -0.43  -0.211  -1.97  -0.014  -0.13  -0.132  -1.27  -0.007  -0.07 
MUS  X  DUC          -0.187  -2.11 -0.142  -1.41 -0.214  -2.43 -0.145  -1.44 -0.184 -2.08 -0.071  -0.71 -0.147  -1.75 -0.079  -0.84 
OBC  X  DUC          -0.024  -0.41 -0.127  -1.99 -0.045  -0.78 -0.125  -1.96 -0.048 -0.84 -0.124  -1.98 -0.078  -1.41 -0.116  -1.95 
Agro-ecological zones:                        
aez2           0.273  2.96  0.271  2.91 0.637 1.46 0.458  1.16 0.452 1.09 0.52 1.45 
aez3           0.601  3.83  -0.217  -1.29  0.602 1.45  -0.127 -0.35 0.441 1.12  -0.173  -0.52 
aez4           0.114  1.71  0.114  1.58 0.383 0.89 0.322  0.82 0.173 0.42  0.372 1.05 
aez5           0.077  0.93  -0.204  -2.35 0.388 0.91 0.156   0.4 0.165 0.41 0.16 0.45 
aez6           0.316  4.15  -0.05  -0.64 0.601 1.47 0.275  0.77 0.462  1.2 0.233  0.72 
aez7           0.49      3.5  -0.024  -0.19 0.319 0.73  -0.208 -0.56 0.202 0.49  -0.188  -0.55 
aez8           0.21  2.17  0.046  0.48  0.114  0.28  0.284    0.8  -0.071 -0.18 0.187  0.57 
aez9           0.281  3.43  0.125  1.45 0.506 1.15    0.4  1  0.273 0.66  0.389 1.07 Model:  Social identity terms  Plus village regime  Plus agro-ecological zones  Plus state dummies  Plus demographic controls 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
  b T b t  b t  b t  b t  b t  b t b t  b t  b t 
aez10          -0.02  -0.26  -0.296  -3.67    0.21    0.5  0.291  0.77  0.017  0.04  0.278  0.81 
aez11           0.034  0.43  -0.116  -1.37  0.261  0.69  0.546  1.62  0.139  0.39  0.524  1.73 
aez12           -0.288  -3.68  -0.379  -4.62  -0.046  -0.13  0.193  0.64  -0.169  -0.51  0.151  0.55 
aez13           -0.115  -1.21  -0.275  -2.65  0.049  0.1  0.259  0.61  -0.114  -0.26  0.272  0.71 
aez14                  -0.082  -1.04 0.23  2.82 0.34  0.75 0.274  0.66 0.068  0.16 0.255  0.68 
aez16          -0.63  -3.37  -0.266  -1.18  -0.611  -3.35  -0.212  -1.01  -0.683  -3.76  -0.175  -0.94 
aez17           -0.195  -1.31  0.365  1.94  -0.224  -0.54  0.429  1.15      
aez18           -0.247  -1.47  -0.61  -4.03  0.041  0.1  0.115  0.34  -0.015  -0.04  0.054  0.17 
aez19                  0.251  1.99 0.178  1.25 0.222 0.52 0.167  0.45 0.011  0.03 0.085  0.25 
State dummy variables:                        
Bihar              -0.188  -0.68  -0.467  -1.79  -0.035  -0.13  -0.318  -1.29 
Gujarat              -0.344  -1.55  -0.122  -0.55  -0.248      -1.2  -0.114  -0.56 
Haryana              -0.088  -0.39  0.058  0.26  0.103  0.49  0.101  0.48 
Himachal  Pradesh              -0.494  -1.84  0.043  0.16  -0.285  -1.13  0.077  0.31 
Karnataka              -0.546  -1.84  -0.27  -1.32  -0.409  -1.35  -0.111  -0.55 
Kerala               0.144  0.55  0.595  2.17  0.228  0.92  0.559  2.13 
Madhya  Pradesh              -0.253  -1.27  -0.528  -2.66  -0.1  -0.55  -0.457  -2.49 
Maharashtra              -0.321  -2.21  -0.262  -1.81  -0.26  -1.96  -0.205  -1.5 
Orissa              -0.366  -2.03  -0.67  -4.49  -0.352  -2.09  -0.584  -4.2 
Punjab              -0.258  -1.09  0.153  0.66  -0.102  -0.46  0.181  0.84 
Rajasthan              -0.513    -2.3  -0.225  -1.02  -0.328  -1.58  -0.143  -0.7 
Tamil  Nadu               0.067  0.47  -0.223  -1.65  0.099  0.73  -0.16  -1.22 
  Uttar  Pradesh              -0.39  -1.67  -0.426  -1.87  -0.206  -0.95  -0.312  -1.48 
West  Bengal              -0.046  -0.13  0.025  0.08  -0.122  -0.35  0.029      0.1 
Uttaranchal              -0.448  -1.68  -0.214  -0.78  -0.235  -0.94  -0.114  -0.45 
Chattisgarh              -0.27  -1.33 -0.627  -3.28 -0.23 -1.22  -0.564  -3.28 
Jharkhand              -0.033  -0.17  -0.146  -0.84  0.042  0.22  -0.128  -0.8 
Tripura                     -0.352  -0.9  0.403  1.19 Model:  Social identity terms  Plus village regime  Plus agro-ecological zones  Plus state dummies  Plus demographic controls 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
  b T b t  b t  b t  b t  b t  b t b t  b t  b t 
Demographic controls                        
Sex of hh head (male = 1)                                  0.031  1.51  -0.012  -0.51 
#  males  aged  0-5                   -0.146  -13.58  -0.179  -14.14 
#  males  aged  6-14                   -0.112  -12.92  -0.142  -15.32 
#  males  aged  15-19                  -0.005  -0.41  -0.036  -2.74 
#      males,  aged  20-24                    0.072  4.79  0.059  3.78 
#      males,  aged  25-49                    0.104  5.74  0.108  7.04 
#      males,  aged  50-59                    0.178  8.03  0.135  5.92 
#   males, aged 60 +                                   0.075  3.57  0.055   2.7 
#  females,  aged  0-5                  -0.131  -13.21  -0.154  -11.97 
#  females,  aged  6-14                   -0.117  -13.76  -0.134  -15.08 
#  females,  aged  15-19                   -0.066  -4.46  -0.089  -6.89 
#  females,  aged  20-24                   -0.016  -0.79  -0.016  -0.88 
#  females,  aged  25-49                    0.07  3.34  0.09  4.62 
#  females,  aged  50-59                    0  0  0.098  3.81 
# females, aged 60 +                                   0.014  0.59  -0.031  -1.36 
#  of  couples  in  household                   -0.021  -1.24  0.05  2.92 
Constant  8.958  389.79 9.192  385.09  8.83  234.67 9.008  224.26 8.787  139.06 9.092  127.22  8.82  22.53 9.043 26.69 8.946 24.04 8.944 28.69 
R  squared  0.061   0.095   0.066   0.107   0.115   0.161   0.137   0.200   0.213   0.284   
N  9111   9111   9111   9111   9111   9111   9111   9111   9111   9111  
Source: HDPI-I (“round 1”) and II (“round 2”) surveys, panel households only; authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual per capita household income in constant 1993/94 prices, with round 2 figures converted using NSSO state-specific rural CPIs. Random effects, with 
standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering within villages; robust t-statistics are reported. Table A2.2 Estimation results of the effects on income of social identity, village regime and additional controls: village infrastructure, 
household education and land 
Controls added:  Village infrastructure  Plus education  Plus land 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
  B  t B  t b  t b  t b  t b  t 
Social identity:              
SC  -0.369  -9.56 -0.452 -11.07 -0.245  -6.58 -0.321  -8.23 -0.154  -4.49 -0.252  -6.81 
ST  -0.311 -4.95  -0.374 -6.17  -0.172 -2.81  -0.234 -4.09  -0.152 -2.72  -0.203 -3.64 
OBC        -0.21  -4.45  -0.259  -5.05  -0.141  -3.08  -0.181          -3.7  -0.129  -3.12  -0.148  -3.25 
MUS  -0.208 -3.48  -0.324 -5.12  -0.113 -1.98  -0.217 -3.59  -0.065 -1.23              -0.14  -2.38 
V i l l a g e   r e g i m e :               
SC X DSC  0.131  2.05  0.289  4.03  0.123  2.01  0.253  3.64         0.06  1.05  0.205  3.16 
SC X PSC  -0.035  -0.72  0.076  1.44  -0.053  -1.08         0.07  1.39  -0.062  -1.34  0.059  1.23 
ST X DST  0.008  0.12  0.019  0.31  -0.006          -0.1  0.005  0.08  0.012  0.22  -0.012  -0.22 
OBC X DOBC  0.095  2.15  0.115  2.49  0.094  2.16  0.097  2.19  0.067  1.73         0.05  1.21 
OBC X DOBC  -0.059          -1.0  0.134           2.2  -0.044  -0.77  0.118  1.98  -0.012  -0.23  0.106  1.98 
MUS X DMUS  0.003  0.04  0.147  1.88  0.006  0.08         0.15  2.01  -0.048  -0.73  0.087  1.21 
DUC  0.116  2.48  0.107           2.3  0.124  2.76  0.105  2.36  0.035  0.89  0.024  0.57 
SC X DUC        -0.09  -1.92        -0.14  -2.81  -0.107  -2.39        -0.15  -3.17         0.01  0.24  -0.045  -1.01 
ST X DUC        -0.14  -1.35        -0.01           -0.1  -0.129  -1.27  0.017  0.18  -0.032  -0.36  0.112  1.26 
MUS X DUC        -0.15  -1.79  -0.094  -0.99  -0.129  -1.58  -0.054  -0.58  0.026  0.34  0.003  0.03 
OBC  X  DUC  -0.091 -1.64  -0.123 -2.07  -0.085 -1.59  -0.113 -1.99 0.076  1.59 0.001  0.01 
A g r o - e c o l o g i c a l   z o n e s :               
aez2  0.175  0.42  0.341  0.88         0.18 0.44  0.296  0.81  -0.026 -0.07 0.223  0.64 
aez3         0.42  1.06  -0.316  -0.86  0.358  0.93        -0.33 -0.95  0.133  0.38 -0.348  -1.05 
aez4  -0.096 -0.23 0.173  0.45  -0.137 -0.34 0.092  0.25  -0.195 -0.52 0.125  0.37 
aez5        -0.07  -0.17  -0.009  -0.02  -0.056 -0.14  -0.066 -0.18  -0.177 -0.48  -0.058 -0.17 
aez6  0.324 0.84  0.111 0.31 0.348  0.91 0.079  0.24 0.233 0.67  0.042 0.13 
aez7  0.149  0.36  -0.342  -0.92         0.22  0.54  -0.294  -0.83  0.028  0.08  -0.319  -0.95 
aez8  -0.046  -0.12         0.07  0.19  0.006  0.02  0.093  0.27  -0.141          -0.4  0.087  0.27 
aez9  0.038  0.09  0.191  0.49  0.001  0  0.072           0.2  -0.043  -0.11  0.139           0.4 Controls added:  Village infrastructure  Plus education  Plus land 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
  B  t B  t b  t b  t b  t b  t 
aez10        -0.15  -0.38  0.118  0.32  -0.211  -0.54  -0.006  -0.02  -0.265  -0.73  0.02  0.06 
aez11  0.046  0.13  0.283  0.85  0.029  0.08  0.244  0.79        -0.12  -0.36  0.194  0.65 
aez12  -0.125  -0.38  0  0  -0.078  -0.24  0.039  0.14  -0.184  -0.61  0.006  0.02 
aez13  -0.374  -0.84  0.074  0.18  -0.303  -0.69  -0.036  -0.09  -0.159  -0.41  0.087  0.24 
aez14  -0.132          -0.3  0.064  0.16  -0.287  -0.67  -0.114          -0.3  -0.178  -0.46  0.028  0.08 
aez16  -0.547  -3.11  -0.129  -0.68  -0.516  -3.06  -0.146  -0.82  -0.413  -2.48  -0.102  -0.59 
aez17  -0.305  -0.78  0.223            0.6  -0.268  -0.69  0.231  0.66  -0.318  -0.89  0.171  0.52 
aez18  -0.016  -0.04  -0.074  -0.22  0.037            0.1  -0.031          -0.1  -0.068           -0.2  -0.005  -0.02 
aez19        -0.03  -0.07  -0.049  -0.13  -0.081          -0.2  -0.116  -0.33  -0.093  -0.25  -0.049  -0.15 
S t a t e   d u m m y   v a r i a b l e s :               
Bihar  0.166  0.63  -0.253  -1.01  0.159          0.6  -0.15  -0.62        -0.15  -0.69  -0.244  -1.09 
Gujarat  -0.051  -0.24  -0.068  -0.33  0.016  0.08  0.031  0.16  0.002  0.01  -0.051  -0.28 
Haryana  0.307  1.41  0.136  0.64  0.395  1.81  0.234  1.14  0.224  1.15  0.184  0.98 
Himachal Pradesh  -0.042  -0.17  0.136  0.55  0.116  0.46  0.259  1.08  0.011  0.05  0.225  1.01 
Karnataka  -0.344  -1.15  -0.102          -0.5  -0.286  -0.93  -0.086  -0.44  -0.344  -1.28  -0.101  -0.55 
Kerala  0.241  0.97  0.491  1.83  0.251  1.05  0.427  1.63  0.255  1.15  0.433  1.71 
Madhya Pradesh  0.179  0.92  -0.398  -2.12  0.288  1.48  -0.255  -1.41  0.097  0.55  -0.353  -2.11 
Maharashtra        -0.17  -1.23  -0.213  -1.53  -0.145  -1.05        -0.21           -1.6  -0.184  -1.49  -0.221  -1.83 
Orissa  -0.302  -1.77  -0.581  -4.07  -0.275  -1.64  -0.576  -4.19  -0.271  -1.81  -0.536  -4.15 
Punjab  0.076  0.34  0.222  1.02  0.174  0.78  0.312  1.48  -0.065  -0.33  0.233  1.21 
Rajasthan  -0.095  -0.44       -0.08  -0.38  0.014  0.07  0.038  0.19  -0.099  -0.51  -0.041  -0.22 
Tamil Nadu  0.043  0.32  -0.183  -1.35  0.014           0.1  -0.222  -1.63  0.037            0.3  -0.228  -1.78 
 Uttar Pradesh  0.017  0.08  -0.256  -1.18  0.115  0.51  -0.152  -0.73        -0.02           -0.1  -0.215  -1.11 
West Bengal        -0.15  -0.43  -0.117  -0.37        -0.09  -0.26  -0.071  -0.24  -0.209  -0.67  -0.063  -0.22 
Uttaranchal  0.012  0.05  -0.049  -0.19  0.183  0.73  0.131  0.52  -0.038  -0.17  0.018  0.08 
Chattisgarh   -0.115          -0.6  -0.453          -2.5  -0.037          -0.2  -0.387  -2.25  -0.013  -0.07  -0.369  -2.29 
Jharkhand          0.04  0.22  -0.079  -0.48  0.054           0.3  -0.082  -0.52  0.077  0.46  -0.002  -0.01 
T r i p u r a                 Controls added:  Village infrastructure  Plus education  Plus land 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
  B  t B  t b  t b  t b  t b  t 
D e m o g r a p h i c   c o n t r o l s :               
Sex of hh head (male = 1)  0.031  1.51  -0.013  -0.55  0.039  1.93  -0.015  -0.66  0.039  2.16        -0.02  -0.92 
# males aged 0-5  -0.146  -13.51  -0.178  -14.03  -0.139  -13.27        -0.16  -13.14  -0.149  -16.14  -0.149  -12.72 
# males aged 6-14  -0.112  -12.88  -0.141       -15.2  -0.102  -12.22  -0.114  -12.73  -0.125  -16.59  -0.125  -14.64 
# males aged 15-19  -0.006  -0.44  -0.035            -2.72  -0.046  -3.62  -0.073  -5.47  -0.077  -6.86  -0.094  -7.63 
#   males, aged 20-24  0.072  4.75         0.06  3.81  0.011  0.73  -0.015  -0.93  -0.011  -0.82  -0.032  -2.18 
#   males, aged 25-49  0.103  5.72  0.108  7.01  0.041  2.38         0.01  0.66  0.013  0.84        -0.01  -0.72 
#   males, aged 50-59  0.179           8.1  0.134           5.9  0.116  5.47  0.065  2.93  0.058           3.1  0.031  1.49 
#   males, aged 60 +   0.075          3.6  0.055           2.7  0.028           1.4  0.002  0.12        -0.03  -1.73  -0.038  -2.06 
# females, aged 0-5  -0.131     -13.24  -0.153        -11.9  -0.124  -12.84  -0.135  -11.02  -0.132  -15.45  -0.138  -11.85 
# females, aged 6-14  -0.117     -13.72  -0.135  -15.14  -0.112  -13.6  -0.117  -13.68  -0.129  -17.12  -0.131  -16.25 
# females, aged 15-19  -0.067      -4.52        -0.09  -6.89  -0.131  -8.34  -0.136  -9.74  -0.135  -9.73  -0.145  -10.88 
# females, aged 20-24  -0.017       -0.86  -0.018  -0.97  -0.092  -4.43  -0.103  -5.48  -0.102  -5.38  -0.112  -6.41 
# females, aged 25-49  0.068        3.24  0.088  4.51  -0.005  -0.23  -0.007  -0.36  -0.036  -1.88  -0.045  -2.38 
# females, aged 50-59  -0.002       -0.11  0.096  3.74  -0.055  -2.48  0.006  0.26  -0.075           -3.8  -0.021  -0.91 
# females, aged 60 +   0.011        0.47  -0.034  -1.47  -0.043  -1.84  -0.104  -4.66  -0.077  -3.69  -0.131  -6.31 
# of couples in household  -0.019      -1.12  0.052  3.01  0.026  1.62  0.106  6.29  0.007  0.49  0.067  4.25 
V i l l a g e   i n f r a s t r u c t u r e :               
Ln(village population)  0.017       0.88  -0.006  -0.38  0.006  0.33  -0.011  -0.78  0.011  0.64  -0.009  -0.61 
School  access:              
Primary  0.006       0.06  0.365  1.89  -0.017  -0.18  0.276  1.51  -0.012  -0.14  0.306  1.79 
Middle  -0.194      -3.21  -0.128  -1.89  -0.184  -3.13  -0.051  -0.77  -0.126  -2.47  -0.066  -1.05 
Lower secondary  0.044        0.65  -0.096  -1.57  0.058  0.86  -0.034  -0.57  0.062  1.04  -0.078  -1.41 
Higher secondary  -0.012       -0.28  -0.075  -1.34  -0.006  -0.13  -0.044  -0.81  -0.023  -0.61  -0.058  -1.12 
Graduate  -0.018       -0.44  -0.068  -1.27  -0.021  -0.51  -0.036  -0.69  -0.021  -0.57  -0.048  -0.97 
Vocational  -0.016       -0.34  -0.028  -0.41  -0.043  -0.91  -0.013           -0.2  -0.003  -0.07  -0.019  -0.31 
M e d i c a l   a c c e s s :               
Doctor  0     -0.2  -0.003  -1.85  0  -0.02  -0.002  -1.55  -0.001  -0.76  -0.002  -1.65 Controls added:  Village infrastructure  Plus education  Plus land 
  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 1  Round 2 
  B  t B  t b  t b  t b  t b  t 
Clinic  -0.017  -0.49  -0.033  -1.08  -0.036  -1.09  -0.035  -1.18  -0.027  -0.91  -0.016  -0.56 
Road  access:              
Feeder  0.069  1.31  -0.012  -0.21  0.064  1.23  -0.018  -0.33  0.039  0.83  -0.017  -0.34 
Tarmac  0.115           2.0  0.008  0.13  0.099  1.76  -0.004  -0.08  0.078  1.54  -0.008  -0.16 
Bus stop  0.016  0.42  0.004  0.14  0.015           0.4  0.011  0.38         0.01  0.32  0.014  0.51 
Railway station       0.1  1.96  0.105  2.09  0.063  1.29  0.068  1.43  0.068  1.54  0.057  1.28 
Post office         0.11  3.04  0.029  0.95  0.106  2.99  0.015  0.52  0.109           3.4  0.017  0.63 
Bank/credit market  -0.048          -1.3  -0.013  -0.39  -0.055  -1.51  -0.048  -1.52  -0.028  -0.87  -0.023  -0.75 
Market/mandi  -0.066  -1.81  0.001  0.05  -0.074  -2.09  0.004  0.15  -0.062  -1.94  0.013  0.48 
Max. educational achievement in the 
household (of those 15+): 
             
Up to primary          0.082  4.36  0.034  1.51  0.067  4.06  0.041  1.94 
Middle       0.177  7.94  0.128  5.98  0.143  7.31  0.129  6.38 
Matriculation       0.273  10.01  0.308  10.64  0.208  8.55  0.285  10.45 
Higher  secondary       0.342  10.07  0.363  11.71         0.28  9.05         0.31  10.54 
Graduate and above          0.584  15.23  0.606  16.5  0.457  12.75  0.512  14.33 
Up to primary          0.083  4.05  0.087  4.01  0.061           3.4  0.071  3.51 
Middle       0.19  6.64  0.116           5.2  0.138  5.46  0.088  4.2 
Matriculation       0.247  6.96  0.149           4.6  0.163  5.13          0.14  4.54 
Higher  secondary       0.193  3.15  0.33  8.34  0.214  3.66  0.263  7.02 
Graduate and above          0.263  2.98  0.336  6.25  0.288  3.63  0.287  5.57 
Household  land:               
Land  owned  in  acres           0.022  5.56  0.029  7.48 
Land  gross  irrigated  in  acres           0.047  12.5  0.036  4.99 
Constant  8.747  21.21  9.207  23.96  8.659  21.33  9.076  25.09  8.822  23.79  9.157  26.48 
R  squared  0.225   0.288   0.270   0.341   0.426   0.418  
N  9111    9111    9111    9111    9111    9111  
Source and Notes: as for Table A2.1 
 